“Crossing the Line” (2006) by Daniel Gordon

Solid documentary that is interesting despite the limited appeal of the material, 12 May 2007

Author: bob the moo from Birmingham, UK

In 1962, the 20 year old PFC James Dresnok was serving in the demilitarised zone between North Korea and South Korea when he just headed across in the northern side of the border. Captured by the North Koreans, Dresnok became the first of several American GI’s to “defect” to the communist North and went on to be enormous propaganda tools to the regime of the time. This film looks back on the life of Dresnok in North Korea and his importance within that regime.

It is hard to deny that this film will have limited appeal as one does have to wonder how well known the Dresnok defection is outside of those from the US who were at a certain age in the early 1960’s. I certainly knew nothing of him but was drawn to the film by the chance of learning more about the mostly inward and secretive North Korea. As such the film is quite interesting because it does give an insider’s view while also having that insider being a westerner. However the film does not just use Dresnok as the way in to the country but he is the focus of the film and this is both a strength and a weakness.

It is a strength in the way that he is a complex but likable character who is an interesting focus but it is a weakness in the way that my interest was not really with him in the first instance. This does leave us with an interesting film but one with a rather limited appeal, meaning that I did find it to be rather too long and occasionally hard work when it is focusing totally on people who I have no knowledge of or vested interest in.

Overall then a solid documentary that is reasonably interesting despite the material having a limited appeal whenever it moves into specific territory (which is the majority).

–

If you have not seen “Crossing the Line” (2006) the documentary about James Dresnok, the American defector to North Korea, here are the links…

Part 1: http://video.aol.com/video-detail/documentary-north-korea-crossing-the-line-2006-part-14/1783044093

Part 2: http://video.aol.com/video-detail/documentary-north-korea-crossing-the-line-2006-part-24/1961013778

Part 3: http://video.aol.com/video-detail/documentary-north-korea-crossing-the-line-2006-part-34/834250604

Part 4: http://video.aol.com/video-detail/documentary-north-korea-crossing-the-line-2006-part-44/3383696678

LP

“Sunshine Policy”: Las dos Coreas ponen en un congelador su política de acercamiento

Pyongyang amenazó con dejar en cenizas a su vecino, en respuesta a la línea dura del nuevo Presidente sudcoreano.

GONZALO VEGA SFRASANI

El Mercurio, SÁBADO 5 DE ABRIL DE 2008

Por su peor momento en años pasan las relaciones entre las dos Coreas. La política de acercamiento iniciada en 1997 —conocida como “Sunshine Policy”—, ha dado paso a la ira norcoreana, que ha amenazado a su vecino con “convertirlo en cenizas”.

¿Qué pasó? En los últimos diez años, Corea del Sur vivió bajo dos gobiernos liberales que buscaron un acercamiento con Pyongyang. Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) y Roh Moo Hyun (2003-2008) se reunieron con el líder norcoreano Kim Jong Il, y premiaron con ayuda humanitaria cualquier paso hacia un desarme nuclear de Pyongyang.

Pero el escenario cambió el 25 de febrero cuando Lee Myung Bak, apodado “el bulldozer”, asumió la presidencia sudcoreana. Lee propuso aumentar la inversión en Norcorea y ayudar a incrementar, en 10 años, el ingreso per cápita de ese país a US$ 3.000, desde los actuales US$ 500… pero sólo si el vecino del Norte abandona su programa de armas nucleares. De lo contrario, se acaba la ayuda.

Pyongyang no se ha guardado nada para expresar su desacuerdo con esta postura: realizó pruebas de misiles, expulsó a funcionarios sudcoreanos, lo amenazó con acciones militares y calificó a Lee de “traidor”.

“La política de Lee recuerda la que tenían los neoconservadores del primer gobierno de George W. Bush hacia Norcorea”, afirma Cheong Seong Chang, del Instituto Sejong de Seúl, refiriéndose a la negativa que tenía EE.UU. de conversar con Pyongyang.

Leonid Petrov, experto en Norcorea de la Universidad Nacional Australiana, afirma a “El Mercurio” que lo que busca Lee es “desestabilizar el régimen norcoreano y provocar un cambio. Esta política deja a Norcorea con una sola opción, la confrontación, porque en esta situación, ni la desnuclearización ni la democratización es aceptable para Pyongyang”.

Pero muchos expertos advierten que la política de Lee no tendrá éxito, y llaman a no olvidar que el régimen de Kim Jong Il ha sobrevivido al aislamiento internacional y a una hambruna que en los años 90 dejó unos dos millones de muertos. Afirman que Norcorea tiene algunas cartas por jugar. China no quiere una península coreana inestable que pueda generar una avalancha de refugiados hacia su territorio, menos en el año en el que el dragón asiático albergará los Juegos Olímpicos.

La furiosa reacción de Norcorea hacia la asunción de Lee esta estaría vinculada, según “The Economist”, con las elecciones parlamentarias sudcoreanas que se realizarán el 9 de abril. Pyongyang espera que los electores rechacen el Gran Partido Nacional (GNP), al que pertenece Lee.

Norcorea piensa que si con sus amenazas logra expandir el temor en la población sudcoreana, esto podría presionar a Lee para que suavice su posición y evite elevar la tensión y dañar el clima de inversión económica en Corea del Sur, ya que Lee fue elegido bajo la promesa de revitalizar la economía.

Pero Lee también tiene que cumplir su promesa de ponerse duro con su vecino. Lee tiene agendada una reunión con Bush el 18 de abril, en la que tratarán estrategias para lidiar con Pyongyang. “Norcorea está enviando una advertencia a EE.UU. y Corea del Sur con miras a esa reunión. Les intenta decir que la situación de la península coreana no se está desarrollando a su favor”, afirma Choi Jin Wook, del Instituto de Corea para la Unificación Nacional.

El diálogo a seis bandas sobre el programa nuclear de Norcorea quedó bloqueado después de que Pyongyang no declarara todos sus programas nucleares antes del fin de 2007, como se había comprometido. ¿Llegó a su fin la “Sunshine Policy”? Según Petrov, “permanecerá congelada por los próximos cinco años, hasta las nuevas elecciones presidenciales en Corea del Sur”, y advierte que se vivirán “algunos períodos de abierta confrontación en la relación intercoreana”.

Some people say that neither sticks nor carrots will work on North Korea

Dear professor Leonid Petrov:

My name is Gonzalo Vega and I am a journalist in “El Mercurio” newspaper, one of the most important in South America. I am sending you this email because I am writing an article about the tensions between South and North Korea, and it would be very important if you could answer some questions about it. It won’t take you more than 5 or ten minutes and once the article be published, I could send you a copy of it to your email.

Dear professor, these are the questions that I want to ask you:
— The President Lee Myung Back has changed the south korean policy towards Pyongyang. He support a hard-line policy. What is he really looking for with this policy?
— Some people said that neither sticks or carrots work with North Korea. Do you share that opinion? Why?
— Do you think that this is the end of the Sunshine policy?

Dear professor, I hope you could participate in this article.
My best regards,

Gonzalo Vega Sfrasani
Journalist
International informations
El Mercurio newspaper
Chile - South America

Dear Gonzalo,

I hope you have read my article “President Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea Policy”
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08025Petrov.html It has many answers to your questions but I’ll give you a little more information:

> The President Lee Myung Bak has changed the South Korean policy towards Pyongyang. He supports a hard-line policy. What is he really looking for with this policy?

- Lee Myung-bak represents the conservative Grand National Party (Hannaradan) which has never been friendly to the communist regime in North Korea. The hard-line policy towards the DPRK is aiming at destabilizing this regime and ultimately bringing about its change. Lee Myung-bak and the GNP perfectly know that the Pyongyang regime cannot survive denuclearization and democratization together, that it why they promise aid and cooperation only after North Korea gives up its nuclear ambitions and improves its human right record. In other words, aid and cooperation will never be extended unless some major change happened in North Korea.

> Some people said that neither sticks nor carrots work with North Korea. Do you share that opinion? Why?

I don’t share this opinion at all. Only when both sticks and carrots are used actively and alternately, will North Korea be cooperative and demonstrate constructive approach. See Dr. Lankov’s article in Financial Times: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8de42f08-f942-11dc-bcf3-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1 “Both strategies should be used persistently. One should not dismiss the other.”

There should always be a choice between the two possible options (one with positive and the other with negative consequences) but both options should be more or less feasible and acceptable. The current Lee Myung-bak’s policy leaves North Korea only with one option - confrontation - because at the current stage neither denuclearization nor democratization is acceptable for Pyongyang.

> Do you think that this is the end of the Sunshine policy?

- For the next five years until the next presidential elections in South Korea the Sunshine Policy will be mothballed and shelved there. Lee Myung-bak’s conservative government will not resume it out of principle (it would be against their pre-election promises). We are likely to experience a deep freeze with some periods of open confrontation between the two Koreas, similar to what it was in the mid-1990s when President Kim Yong-sam was pursuing the policy of containment against orth Korea but strongly pro-American policy towards the United States.

Like it was then, the DPRK will probably improve its relations with the US. And who knows, maybe the new Democrat administration in Washington will start radiating Sunshine toward North Korea…

LP

Cooking Oysters on Petrol in North Korea

Making BBQ on car petrol might sound like a crazy idea: it’s dangerous and not healthy. But in North Korea, where firewood is a luxury, this method is the most popular way to have a picnic. All you have to do is to forget about the bitter lead aftertaste in your mouth and enjoy the atmosphere of friendship and hospitality…

LP

Film Screening: “The Schoolgirl’s Diary” (2006)

-With commentary from Suk-Young Kim, University of California at Santa Barbara
________________________________________
April 09, 2008 4:00 – 6:30pm
6th Floor Auditorium
Woodrow Wilson Center
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004

 

Visit www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp for more information, and to RSVP

The North Korea International Documentation Project invites you to attend a screening of the North Korean film “The Schoolgirl’s Diary” (Han Nyeohaksaengeui Ilgi) followed by commentary by Suk-Young Kim, assistant professor of theater and dance at the University of California at Santa Barbara, and an expert on North Korean propaganda.

The Schoolgirl’s Diary (2006, in Korean, no subtitles) is the story of a self-absorbed North Korean teenager, Soo-Ryeon, who yearns to move to an apartment from her home in the countryside and questions the values of her father and mother, a scientist and a librarian at the academy of sciences who put the good of the nation before that of their family. Soo-Ryeon realizes how selfish she is only after her mother falls ill and her father makes a major breakthrough in his research. The film’s screenwriters reportedly received guidance in drafting the script from North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.

Suk-Young Kim is assistant professor of theater and dance at the University of California at Santa Barbara. She is currently completing a book project titled Illusive Utopia: Theater, Film, and Everyday Performance in North Korea, which explores how state produced propaganda performances intersect with everyday life practice in North Korea. Another book project, Long Road Home: A Testimony of a North Korean Camp Survivor (coauthored with Kim Yong) is forthcoming from Columbia University Press.

“The Schoolgirl’s Diary” (2006) is, indeed, the most interesting piece of work recently produced by Pyongyang filmmakers. It looks like an attempt to depict the growing conflict between selfishness and self-sacrifice in North Korea. Echoing the Russian film Courier [Kurier] (1986), which hit the records of popularity in the Perestroika-stricken Soviet Union, this film employs the convenient method of viewing the grim reality of life through the eyes of a teenager. If something in the film is politically unpalatable, it is the immaturity of the main character that has to be blamed – not the film director (Jang In-hak or Kim Jong-il himself?).

The main character, Suryeon, gets increasingly frustrated with her poor and naïve parents who “foolishly” devoted themselves to the country and the people. Her protest may look unsophisticated but small details reveal political overtones. In one scene, where Suryeon is arguing with her younger sister over the quality of food in their lunchboxes, her blouse and skirt also show aggressive colours – namely stars and stripes (just like on the US flag). Is this a new vogue in modern Pyongyang? Or maybe the director’s tongue-in-cheek? Some people still argue that it were blue jeans and rock music that destroyed socialism in the USSR.

It looks like this film is trying to address the issues vital to North Korea’s survival. In the DPRK it was viewed by some 8 million people just in the first six months. Pretty Pictures bought the screening rights to show it in Europe last year. Who knows, maybe this film will open a new dimension of the “Hallyu” phenomenon? It would be interesting to hear the opinion of those who have seen it already.

LP

Lee Myung-bak’s “neo-engagement policy” toward NK

After reading my article “President Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea Policy”, Professor Tae-Hwan Kwak wrote to the Nautilus Institute:

Mr. Petrov’s analysis of Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea policy is very informative and penetrating. I do agree on many of his major arguments.

In my view, Lee’s “pragmatic” North Korea policy based on some principles of South Korea’s previous governments’ engagement policy toward North Korea (i.e., the Sunshine Policy by President Kim and Peace and Co-prosperity by President Roh) does not totally reject the previous governments’ engagement policy toward the DPRK, but Lee’s major goals are the same, but he is using different policy instruments to achieve his goals.

It appears that a hard-line policy toward North Korea will not work. “Conditional economic incentives” in the “3000 Vision” initiative may not induce the DPRK to speed up the North Korea’s denuclearization process, but North Korea should not perceive them as Lee’s hard-line policy. In my view, Lee’ s new North Korea policy may be called as “neo-engagement policy” toward North Korea. It favors denuclearization and does not support a hard-line policy or “disengagement”. Therefore, the DPRK should correctly read Lee’s new policy toward it, and its cooperative behavior will insure Chairman Kim Jong Il’s best interests.

Dr. Tae-Hwan Kwak

Former President, Korea Institute for National Unification and
Professor Emeritus, Eastern Kentucky University

- Professor Kwak’s opinion is very interesting and insightful. Lee Myung-bak’s North Korea policy might look novel and may be dubbed the “neo-engagement”. However we should not forget that everything “new” is just a well forgotten “old”. Lee is risking to simply repeat the containment policy of former ROK President Kim Yong-sam. By emphasising the importance of ROK-US alliance and putting inter-Korean relations on a conditional footing (as it was in the mid-1990s), Seoul’s hard-won influence over Pyongyang soon will be forfeit to Washington. I don’t want to say that it will be a catastrophe (particularly if the new administration in Washington decides to cooperate with the DPRK) but it will certainly diminish Seoul’s influence upon future developments.

LP
–

Here is a comment from Prof. Kim Myong Chol from the Centre for Korean American Peace in Japan:

Dear Mr. Leonid Petrov,

I have found your article in the March 9-13 Korea Times the best article proposing the most working solution to the nuclear crisis between the DPRK and the US. I express total endorsement to your article. I have found your article so good that I have referred it to Ambassador Pak Kil Yon in New York.

In my Feb 22 talk at Clumbia University Weatherhead East Asian Institute, I stated: “The iron rule of the nuclear agreement is action for action. The DPRK has disabled 90% of the nuclear facility and provided a list of the nuclear program, but the DPRK has received mere one fifth of the promised oil supply and has see no sign of its removal from the US terror list. We see no good reason to move farther. The US is in material breach of the nuclear agreement. We cannot trust the US and we see no good reason to reduce or renounce the nuclear weapons. We will continue building up the nuclear deterrence.”
One State Department official attended my talk. On March 6, Hill gave a talk at the same institute.

Best Regards,
Kim Myong Chol
Centre for Korean American Peace

NKorea threatens to cut all dialogue with SKorea

SEOUL (AFP) - North Korea’s military on Saturday threatened to cut all dialogue with South Korea, calling for an apology over remarks by the South’s top military general and signalling a further slide in relations. On Wednesday, South Korea’s new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Kim Tae-Young, told parliament the South would strike the North’s nuclear sites should the communist country attack it with nuclear weapons. The North’s retort late Saturday followed its test-firing of several short range missiles on Friday, an action backed by a warning that it could slow down work to disable atomic plants.

- Even before Mr. Lee moved to the Presidential Blue House in Seoul, many people in Asia and beyond associated his ascendance to power with the potential deterioration of inter-Korean relations. If not a complete freeze, a serious cooling was expected the fragile North-South Korean cooperation. Some political groups found his conservative stance and rhetoric while others welcomed the fresh approach.

The war of words on what policy toward North Korea is more effective has been going on between the two camps the supporters of unconditional engagement and the pragmatic conservatives. It is likely that debate will continue because a solution for the issues regarding the DPRK (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea’s official name) is still nowhere in sight…

LP

Read the full text of my article on this issue at Nautilus Institute’s website here (in English)

«Доктрина Ли Мён Бака» и будущее межкорейских отношений (in Russian)

Не обойдётся без перемен и в вопросах внешней политики. Консервативные круги, интересы которых выражает партия «Ханнара», никогда не испытывали симпатий к пхеньянскому коммутистическому режиму. Именно по этому, уже во время своей предвыборной кампании Ли Мён Бак заявил, что в случае его избрания президентом отношения с северным соседом подвергнутся серьёзной ревизии. Он также высказывался за сближение с США (традиционным и главным стратегическим партнёром Южной Кореи) в координации дейстивий по отношению к КНДР. Намерения новой президентской администрации пересмотреть все соглашения достигнутые между Севером и Югом за последние несколько лет порядком насторожили либерально настроенную общественность.

ЛП

N.Korea Expells S.Korean officials from Kaesong Industrial Zone

 

Yahoo! Asia News has just reported: SEOUL (AFP) - North Korea on Thursday expelled all 11 South Korean officials from a joint industrial estate just north of the border in retaliation for Seoul’s new tougher line towards the communist state.

The move was in protest at comments by a South Korean minister linking expansion of the Kaesong estate to the North’s denuclearisation, Seoul’s unification ministry said. Last week, Unification Minister Kim Ha-Joong said Kaesong would not be expanded unless progress was made in scrapping the North’s nuclear programme. On Wednesday Kim added that improvements in bilateral relations “will be decided according to progress in the North Korean nuclear issue.”

-Ouch! I told them so… See What North Korea Policy Will Lee Pursue?

LP

How North Koreans overcome the shortage of electricity

The Daily NK describes how North Koreans, who have faced chronic shortages of electricity, use conventional and alternative means to meet their basic needs.

“People overcome the shortage of electricity on their own. They import a large number of batteries from China. In addition, there are many households which have a bicycle generator,” Mr. Shin said, “Even though no electricity is provided by the state, people can manage to get by. Indeed, they get used to the shortage of electricity and can solve the problem on their own.”

- A similar situation was in the USSR well until the later 1970s - early 1980s. Not only in provinces but in the large cities too.

“Unlike their counterparts in the city, many people in the rural areas do not use motor vehicle batteries because they need not only the battery but also a 220v converter, current transformer and low voltage circuit breaker to watch TV and video, Mr. Shin said.”

- The picture above shows such batteries and a voltage converter.

“In North Korea, it costs 70,000 North Korean Won to get a used motor vehicle battery and 120,000 to 160,000 North Korean won to get a new one. Considering the availability of repair services, people prefer to buy the domestically produced ‘Daedong River Battery’ to its Chinese counterpart even though Chinese one is of better quality,” said the merchant.

- That’s correct! Last October I checked the prices for small generators sold at the T’ongil Market in Pyongyang and was asked 140,000 NKW. However, in Pyongyang people have more cash in hands.  However, a greater variety of consumer goods in Pyongyang markets makes the competition there stronger.

When asked whether North Korean people complain about the shortage of power, the merchant said, “Do you think the government has ever provided anything for its people? These days, people have become accustomed to making a living with their own hands even if there is no provision from the government.”

- People in NK, like it was in the former USSR, have little expectations of government ability to help them with their daily needs. But they don’t blame the government for inefficiency. Instead, they see the source of their misery in the hostility of foreign nations (first of all the US), continuing conflict with South Korea, the collapse of Socialism in China and Russia, and natural disasters….

LP

북한의 범죄 행위는 생존 전략의 일환이다

레오니드 페트로프(호주국립대학)

북한 마약 운반선 봉수호의 선장 및 3명의 선원에 대한 오스트레일리아 빅토리아 주 최고법원의 최근 무죄 판결은 아무도 예상치 못했을 정도로 놀랍다. 북한이 국제 무대에서 불법 행위를 지원하고 있다는 지배적인 견해는 오스트레일리아인과 미국의 북한 전문가 2명(에이드리안 부조, 발비나 황, 조 베르뮤데스)가 행한 증언에 잘 표현되어 있다. 이들은 조선민주주의인민공화국(DPRK)의 최고 지도부가 사건의 배후에 있다고 믿어 의심치 않았다. 그런데도 여성 7인과 남성 6인으로 구성된 배심원단은 봉수호 선장 송만선, 정치 지도원 최동송, 1등 항해사 리만진, 1등 기관사 리주천에 대해 무죄를 판결하고 3년간의 구금 상태에서 그들을 석방시켰다…

The full story is here:
http://north-korea.narod.ru/PongSu_acquitted_kor.htm