“My Father, Kim Jong Il, and I: Kim Jong Nam’s Exclusive Confession”

Yoji Gomi, Senior Staff Writer, Tokyo Shimbun, author of “My Father, Kim Jong Il, and I: Kim Jong Nam’s Exclusive Confession” gave press conference given at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan on Jan 24, 2012.

For journalists, getting reliable information out of North Korea is notoriously difficult. Getting a one-on-one interview with an insider with unique insight into the family that has run the country since it was created, the party, the politics and the people definitely counts as a scoop.

Yoji Gomi, a journalist with the Tokyo Shimbun, must thank the gods of journalism for the chance meeting in a Beijing airport with Kim Jong-Nam.

The oldest son of the recently departed Dear Leader, Kim Jong-nam was apparently being groomed to succeed Kim Jong-il as leader of the reclusive state until he was arrested in May 2001 trying to enter Japan on a forged Dominican Republic passport with two women and a boy aged 4. He told Japanese police that he wanted to visit Disneyland.

Furious at his son’s indiscretion, Kim Jong-il banished him to Macau and turned to Kim Jong-un as his eventual successor.

After meeting Gomi in Beijing, the journalist interviewed the man who could have been ruling North Korea, in Macao and through more than 150 e-mails. The result is the timely release, on January 20, of “My Father, Kim Jong-Il, and I: Kim Jong-Nam’s Exclusive Confession.”

Gomi commented on Kim Jong-Nam’s opposition to the hereditary transition of power to his half-brother and his ambition to one day return to his homeland.

Listen to the audio record (MP3) of the press conference here…

North Korea: Kim Jong-un as Leader – How Pyonyang may change?

Opinions differ as to what will be the eventual outcome of the death of North Korea’s Kim Jong-il and the official transfer of power to his third son, Kim Jong-un.

In an essay in the Sydney Morning Herald, AIIA member Hamish McDonald explores a range of possibilities. Apart from the possibility of change within the Pyongyang regime itself, there are the complex attitudes and strategic interests of the various powers involved in on-off talks to bring peace to the Korean peninsula and persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program.

China fears a surge of refugees across its border if hostilities break out and worries that the United States could gain a foothold on its border. Japan is uneasy about the industrial muscle of a united Korea while other countries see investment and market opportunities. No one, however, wants to see a destabilisation of the peninsula – how the DPRK manages itself under its new leadership and how the regional powers engage the regime is crucial to this end.

Few expect any change to happen quickly. The Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) in Sydney has assembled a panel of experts to discuss one of the top agenda items of 2012.

Joining us will be Dr. Leonid Petrov, lecturer in Korean studies at the University of Sydney and Korean scholar who trained at the Institute of Oriental Studies in St Petersburg. Prof. Petrov has also held the chair in Korean studies at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris.

Mack Williams was Australia’s ambassador in Seoul at the time of the last North Korean handover. Mr Williams is a former president of the AIIA in Sydney and chairman of the board of the UTS Insearch program. He also chairs the Korea-Australasian research Centre at the University of New South Wales.

Professor Peter Hayes from the Nautilus Institute will join us by video link from San Francisco. Prof. Hayes’ paper on North Korea has attracted international attention.

Date: Tuesday,  21 February, 2012

Time: Refreshments 6:00 pm; Presentation 6:30 pm – 7.30pm

Venue: The Australian Institute of International Affairs invites you to, The Glover Cottages, 124 Kent Street, Sydney (located adjacent to the Kent St Fire Station)

Cost: AIIA members $15; Senior members / students $10;
Visitors $20;    Senior Visitors $15;  Student Visitors:  $10

PLEASE RSVP ONLINE or EMAIL ACCEPTANCE to nsw.branch@aiia.asn.au

Payment may be made at the door by cash/cheque/credit card

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Rev. Kang Young-Sup dies at the age of 80

Rev. Kang Young-Sup, the Chairperson of the Central Committee, the Korean Christian Federation in North Korea, passed away on the 21st of January 2012 at the age of 80.

Kang, a family member of late Kim Jong Il, was the son of Kang Ryang Wook, the sixth cousin of Kang Dong Wook, Kim Il Sung’s maternal grandfather.

The National Council of Churches in Korea sent its letter of condolence to the Korean Christian Federation. The following is the Letter of Condolence written by Rev. Kim Young-Ju, General Secretary of the NCCK dated January 23rd, 2012.

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Dear Rev. Oh Kyung Woo, General Secretary of the Korean Christian Federation,

The National Council of Churches in Korea express its sincere condolences on the death of Rev. Kang Young-Sup, Chairperson of the Central Committee of the Korean Christian Federation, and send our deepest consolation to his bereaved family and the members of the KCF.

The NCCK expresses its deepest gratitude on his devotion and sincere commitment for peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula through various exchanges and cooperation of christians between North and South Korea. Remembering of his desire, the NCCK will do our best in our journey toward peace and reunification on the Korean peninsula as the great task of our nation through continuous cooperation in solidarity of the KCF.

We pray that God’s consolation be with his bereaved family and member of the Korean Christian Federation who are in the midst of grieving and suffering.

Rev. Kim Young-Ju

General Secretary

The National Council of Churches in Korea

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Rev. Kang Young-Sup attended the International Consultation on Peace, Reconciliation and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula: Towards an Ecumenical Vision beyond the Tozanso Process in Tsuen Wan, Hong Kong, 21-23 October 2009.

See the video clip of Rev. Kang Yong-seop (Head of NK Delegation) speaking there…

Also, see “통일위해 뜨거운 눈물로 기도하자”조그련 강영섭 위원장, 최초 CBS 단독인터뷰

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North Korean Realities

By Peter Drysdale (East Asia Forum, January 16th, 2012)

One of the more momentous changes in Asia that heralded in the New Year was the sudden death of North Korean leader, Kim Jong-il, and the succession by his son, Kim Jong-un.

Kim Jong-il’s death had long been seen by some outside observers as portent for the collapse of the North Korean regime and the announcement encouraged much comment that reflected these forebodings, including calls for calm from political leaders who should have been in the know.

Certainly there were anxieties about whether the assumption of the North Korean leadership by a relatively untried and youthful Kim Jong-un would be accompanied by a power struggle in the North and political instability. Cooler heads saw little immediate sign of that.

In this week’s lead Chung-in Moon and John Delury at Yonsei University urge focus on the realities that face North Korea itself and the rest of the world in dealing with the isolated state, not imagined contingencies surrounding the leadership change. Their injunction is timely. Moon was a key adviser to former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung on North Korean affairs and heavily involved in negotiations between the North and the South that saw the Sunshine policy put in place. But he is a hard-headed realist.

Delury and Moon point out that there are no signs of political ferment in North Korea. For the moment, the system is quite stable. The regime is ‘unified around the new face of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, the son of Kim Jong-il and, most importantly, the grandson of founding father Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-un does not need charisma. In North Korea’s hierarchic ‘big leader’ suryong system, the young Kim is born to authority. His Baekdu bloodline is sufficient to endow his rule with legitimacy. And his power base is solid’. This is an hereditary system of rule as much as an authoritarian one.

Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy is secured by three inner circles. The first is the ruling family. The key sign of unity within the family is that Kim Jong-un’s aunt and her powerful husband Jang Song-taek both received promotions along with the heir-apparent at the historic Party conference last year. The second is the Korean Worker’s Party itself, which has been going through a period of resuscitation. The revitalised network of Party members — who now carry cell phones and are eager to travel abroad — see their prospects very much linked to the success of the grandson. The third is the military — the Korean People’s Army — which is the logical competitor in the power succession. But even in the army there is no sign of high-level disaffection like that seen in many Middle Eastern states. ‘The military’, Delury and Moon point out, ‘has been the primary beneficiary of the North’s ”military first politics” campaign initiated by Kim Jong-il in 1995′. The military has been co-opted through numerous incentives, and controlled through close confidants. The military has pledged loyalty to Kim Jong-un, whose highest title is Vice Chair of the Central Military Committee of the Korean Worker’s Party.

As for the 20 million or so North Koreans not in the Party, they are likely to take a wait-and-see approach to the new leadership group. Kim Jong-un bears a striking physical resemblance to his grandfather, evoking nostalgia for North Korea’s halcyon days, and people may hope his rule will see a new, better chapter for their country. Whatever the case, those who may wish to rebel have no networks or organisations through which to do so. For now, all signs confirm the state media slogans: Kim Jong-un is the ‘outstanding leader of our party, army and people’ and ‘great successor’ to his father.

In the near term, the chances of political crisis, let alone regime collapse, are remote. In the longer term, however, North Korea faces the same perennial hard choices: the dilemma, Delury and Moon call it, of mutually conflicting goals.

Pyongyang proclaims to its citizens that 2012 marks the year of North Korea’s emergence as a ‘strong and prosperous great nation’ [Gangsong Daeguk]. ‘If Kim Jong-il could claim nothing else’, say Delury and Moon, ‘he did achieve at least one thing for North Korea — the ultimate ”strength” of nuclear deterrence’.

What most outside observers of North Korean affairs miss is the importance of the goal of world standard prosperity. It was set out again post-succession in the New Year’s joint editorial in North Korea’s three main newspapers. There are unmistakable signs of a push to improve the national economy — from growing trade with and investment from China, revived plans for special economic zones and official propaganda promising to improve the people’s welfare.

The issue at stake is whether Kim Jong-un can enhance North Korea’s prosperity without undermining the source of its strength — its nuclear weapons program. ‘Comprehensive economic development will also require foreign investment, trade, and financing; all of which would require negotiation of loosening, and eventual lifting, the sanctions which surround the North Korean economy like a barbed wire fence. Getting that sanctions regime lifted will require substantive nuclear concessions on Pyongyang’s part’.

This, of course, opens opportunity for dealing between Pyongyang, Washington, Beijing and Seoul. As Delury and Moon observe, it will be in that moment, the transition from security-first to security-plus-prosperity, when the unity of the North Korean political system would come under strain. It was perhaps ever thus. ‘Elements in the military might oppose sacrificing their prize possession — nuclear weapons capability. Hardliners will argue it would be a fool’s errand to give up the ultimate weapon, leaving their country exposed to an Iraqi or Libyan fate’.

The path to getting the North over that hump needs to start now, with building constructive relationships with their new leadership, and avoiding the risk of playing into the hands of hardliners, and above all investing in the capacities now that North Koreans will need to run a prosperous and open economy and society. There are signs that this is recognised in Washington and Seoul, though unfortunately not in Canberra which had earlier played a helpful role in prosecuting just this interest — and again is positioned, because of the importance of being unimportant, to do so now.

*Peter Drysdale is the Editor of the East Asia Forum.

The DPRK Interregnum: Window of Opportunity for the International Community

By Victor Hsu (Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, January 10, 2012)

Now that the funeral of Kim Jong Il is over, it is time for the international community to explore avenues of engaging with the DPRK, rather than trying to read the tea leaves about who is in charge or whether Kim Jong Un is the real Supreme Leader and Military Commander. This period presents a window of opportunity either to engage constructively or to destabilize the Korean peninsula. It is truly a time of danger and opportunity. While it is legitimate to expect the DPRK to take the first step, there is an equal onus on the international community to adopt policies and strategies to encourage the DPRK to initiate a new chapter in its foreign policy. However, this post funeral interregnum may be ironically the right time for the “strategic patience” policy of the Obama’s administration.

First, it is important to bear in mind that following precedent is a basic rule of engagement on the part of the DPRK. It was a full three years before Kim Jong Il emerged to lead the country following Kim Il Sung’s unexpected death. There is no reason for the DPRK not to observe a similar period of prolonged national mourning. Of course, next year is the 100th anniversary of the birth of the eternal President, Kim Il Sung. The celebration is likely to proceed in April. Moreover, to use a term often employed by the DPRK to describe the success of Kim Il Sung and the DPRK heroes, the “exploits” of the Dear Leader will be extolled and given more prominence than if he were still alive. This is already evident from the DPRK’s annual New Year’s Editorial which has heaped high praise on the accomplishments of Kim Jong Il.

Second, the confirmation of Kim Jong Un as the “supreme leader and commander” is to be expected. Anything else would be a real surprise and would warrant speculation and analysis. For analysts keen to spot fissures in the leadership of the DPRK, perhaps the sole speculation that can be made is a possible vacuum in the decision-making process. Kim Jong Un is unlikely to take bold unilateral actions unless his position or his family is threatened. In fact, he may even welcome a prolonged period of national celebration of his father and grandfather.

It is unrealistic to expect dramatic policy reversal or new initiatives for the foreseeable future. If anything, it will be business as usual unless the leadership is forced or provoked into taking action.

Therefore, in the near term, the international community should:

-   Avoid taking actions that will force the DPRK to make premature decisions.
-    Respond to the DPRK should the invitation be extended to resume existing negotiations.

This past week, newspaper editorials noted the absence of commentary on the DPRK nuclear program in the New Year Joint Editorial and questioned the DPRK’s motivation. In fact, keeping silent on controversial issues is part of the DPRK’s diplomatic brinksmanship and has been the DPRK’s signature negotiation tool.
Third, following precedent, the DPRK is likely to resume existing formal or back channel talks and honor existing commitments, be it the 6-party talks or a new round of food/nutrition aid from the US government, or the joint ventures in Kaesong or tours to Mount Kumgang by South Koreans. The Joint Editorial contains ample indications about DPRK’s desire to be a “thriving country,” with a “knowledge-based economy.”  There are repeated references to “achieving prosperity” with world standards.  For 2012, it talks about

“the important task of scaling without fail the historical-stage targets… true to the lifetime instructions of General Kim Jong Il. By registering a brilliant success in this year’s struggle for opening the gates of a thriving country, we must enter a new, high stage of building a thriving socialist country in an all-round way.”

Therefore, for example, “light industries” should be a “modern base” to produce “larger quality goods” that “cater to people’s tastes” and are “welcomed” by them.  Equally significant is the highlighting of solving the food problem as a “burning issue” and the pathway to prosperity.

In order for the DPRK to become “a thriving nation,” the technocrats and sectoral professionals, will have to play a pivotal role. Ideology, alone, cannot feed the people or achieve prosperity.  To quote from the Joint Editorial, the professionals with technical know-how and expertise will have to ensure that:

-    “Farming materials and machinery needed” “hit the target for agricultural production.”
-    “Modern bases for stockbreeding and poultry farming and large-size fruit and fish farms” lead to “the improvement of people’s living standards, run at full capacity.”
-    Continue the construction of large hydropower stations, thermal powered mining, metallurgy, and upgrade railroads, and chemical industries.
-    Guide scientific research to develop “core, basic technologies, including information and nano technologies and bioengineering, and promote technical engineering in major fields and produce more research findings that would beat the world.”

In short, “all sectors and units of the national economy should drastically increase the capacity for developing new technologies and products of their own, and push forward in a far-sighted way the work of turning the national economy into a technology-intensive one.”  Hence, “talents in the field of science and technology,” are “precious assets of the country,” to be “given prominence and the conditions for their scientific research should be provided at the highest standard.”

The challenges that the Joint Editorial laid out for 2012 are formidable. But the contours of a roadmap to its economic prosperity are clearly laid out. To date, governments in North America and the European Union have refused to engage the DPRK in any form of assistance other than humanitarian aid. The technocrats within the DPRK will not be able to accomplish their mandate without technical upgrade, inputs and resources.

Interestingly, NGOs such as Adventist Disaster Response Agency, American Friends Service Committee, Christian Friends of Korea, Eugene Bell Foundation, German Agro-Action, Global Resources Services, Mercy Corps, Samaritan’s Purse, Save the Children UK, and World Vision have had fruitful partnerships with the DPRK in projects that address organic farming, upgrading of clinics and hospitals, livestock, food aid, vegetable and fruit fertigation and renewable energy.  These are helpful knowledge sharing activities seen by the DPRK to be particularly valuable.

This post funeral interregnum in the DPRK should be seen as a window of opportunity for moving its relationships in a constructive direction. The international community should take time to network and to plan a coordinated engagement at multiple levels such as exchange visits, knowledge sharing activities, and other confidence building measures.  A coordinated plan is necessary to avoid duplication, to maximize the increasingly scarce resources among traditional donors and to gather the lessons learned for follow-up.  Donors should facilitate this networking by supporting civil society knowledge-sharing efforts. Civil society access is more sustainable and is less susceptible to the vicissitudes of inter-state relations, as the history of NGO involvement there has amply demonstrated.  If NGO involvement has decreased in recent years it is in large measure due to decreased donor funding.

It is also time for the international community to consider the implications of the existing UN sanctions which have not been effective and are perceived mainly as a political exercise by states with few options to punish the DPRK’s nuclear program.  It should also ask itself whether the relationship with the DPRK should be dictated by, and solely confined to, the now highly contentious nuclear and human rights issues. Countries not involved in the 6-party negotiations, such as those in the EU, should encourage the broadening of the engagement agenda with the DPRK to include confidence building measures.

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*Victor Hsu, a Visiting Professor at the Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management.

Towards co-operative partnership with two Koreas

 (Leonid Petrov, Public speech at the Regional Meeting of ROK National Unification Advisory Council in Sydney, 28 Oct. 2011)

In March 2008, the then newly-elected Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd declared his foreign policy philosophy and promised that “during the course of the next three years, the world will see an increasingly activist Australian international policy in areas where we believe we may be able to make a positive difference”. Rudd assured the audience that the new Australian government was committed to the principle of “creative middle-power diplomacy” as the best means of enhancing Australia’s national interests.

Since then Australia has already made great steps forward in departing from the one-sided conservative foreign policy of the Howard Years. The Australian Labor Party now proudly states that its foreign policy platform is based on the three pillars – alliance with the US, active membership of the UN, and comprehensive engagement with Asia – that manifest realism, liberal internationalism, and regionalism. Given this approach, how can Australia develop a comprehensive and co-operative partnership with the two Koreas and contribute to the building of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region?

In April 2011, while visiting Seoul, Australia’s Prime Minister Julia Gillard admitted that “China, Japan and Korea are countries of vital strategic and economic importance in the Asia-Pacific region and to Australia. They are Australia’s top three export destinations and three of Australia’s top four trading partners overall”. But at the Korean War memorial in Kapyong (the place of fierce fighting between Australians and Chinese), she brushed off the prospects for resuming denuclearisation talks with North Korea, saying “There’s no point just saying ‘sit down and talk’, if the talks are not going to achieve anything.”

Despite the pledge for a balanced regional partnership, Australia maintains strong relations with the ROK but minimal relations with the DPRK. While maintaining formal diplomatic links, Canberra has little plans to open its embassy in Pyongyang. Most bilateral cooperation with the North has been put on hold by the Australian side “until the nuclear-weapon crisis is resolved”. The closure of the DPRK’s embassy in Canberra in 2008 seemed to be a logical outcome of this freeze in relations. There is little discussion of the future of Australia-DPRK relations in the media. Reports on trade with North Korea produced by the Australian government reflect a pessimistic posture.

Certainly, the DPRK is not an ordinary state and its social order is unique in today’s world. To deal with North Korea successfully we must remember and understand Cold War history and its consequences for the region. The reality of the inter-Korean conflict must be taken into account whenever we try to engage in dialogue or cooperation. Sensibility and understanding in dealing with Korea and Koreans are as important as first-hand knowledge of their country, language and culture. Sadly, preoccupation with pragmatism and allied solidarity left Australia-Korea relations lopsided.

To be pragmatic means to understand that regime change in North Korea, despite the long-standing predictions, cannot happen in current circumstances. The Korean War has never ended, and as long as regional powers help one side of the divided Korea and bully the other, the division of Korea will continue. Without our full diplomatic recognition, solid security assurance, and fair economic treatment the DPRK will not follow China or Vietnam’s examples in market reforms and democratisation. Instead, North Korea will remain consolidated ideologically with no room for political freedom or economic liberalism.

The demise of its supreme leader, Kim Jong-il, has already triggered the power succession process, which may open new opportunities for negotiations. We also know that man-made and natural disasters began hitting North Korea again, leaving the population weakened and desperate. The fall in grain production around the world and rising international grain prices have also put international food donors into a difficult situation. Last year the World Food Program (WFP) warned that North Korea would need massive food aid in the coming months to avert widespread hunger caused by severe floods, economic sanctions, and ineffective diplomacy.

In the meantime, inter-Korean relations have deteriorated to a level previously known only in the Cold War era. The sinking of the Cheonan Corvette and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island are commonly attributed to Pyongyang’s “erratic and dangerous behavior”, but are rarely associated with Seoul’s actions in the disputed waters around the controversial Northern-Limit Line. Neither of these incidents would have occurred if the agreements of the June 2000 and October 2007 Inter-Korean Summits had been implemented. The Peace and Prosperity (or “Sunshine”) Policy had prioritised economic and humanitarian cooperation over political and military considerations, and was quite effective.

These days, South Korean producers dump millions of tons of quality food that could bring famine relief to their brethren in the North. I think that it would be much wiser for the ROK government to assume more active responsibility for the wellbeing of the people residing in the territories which will sooner or later become part of the unified Korea. Similarly, an Australia that routinely helps the flood victims in Myanmar and drought victims in Afghanistan could more actively assist the impoverished people of North Korea. Wouldn’t it be better if the Labor government in Canberra, together with administrations in Seoul and Pyongyang could cement the foundation for a new balanced relationship?

As the first step towards ending the war in Northeast Asia the mutual recognition of both the ROK and DPRK is necessary. Although both governments understand the pros and cons of peaceful co-existence the Cold War mentality that dominates the region does not permit such an option. In order to resolve the Korean knot both competing states in the North and South should dismantle the thesis of exclusive legitimacy on the peninsula, on which the whole building of their respective identities and statehood are founded. Sadly, as long as the ideology of nationalism permeates their domestic politics, I don’t think it is possible.

Confrontation will continue indefinitely until the regional powers decide to interrupt the vicious circle and change the paradigm of relations. But to make this situation sustainable, a special status (neutral and non-nuclear) should be given to the Korean peninsula with no place for foreign troops or conflicting alliances. Only this would stop the century-long foreign rivalry for domination in Korea, and help the Koreans reconcile.

While the Cold War mentality rules inter-Korean relations and limits contacts between the people of North and South Korea to an absolute minimum, it is impossible to expect much support from below either. The best example of balance between the grass-root initiative and government actions was achieved during the 10 years of Sunshine Policy. Its main principles were: “give first, take later” and “easy tasks first, difficult tasks later”. It’s time to understand that there is no alternative to such policy, and the sooner the ROK government resumes it the brighter will be the future for Korea and Koreans.

Differences in political views and economic systems must not divide but should rather enhance the value of partnership and help complement each other’s strengths. By intensifying diplomatic ties and expanding economic cooperation with both halves of divided Korea we can make a significant contribution to the peaceful resolution of the nuclear problem and prepare the basis for durable peace and prosperity in the region.

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Published as “Toward partnership with two Koreas” (The Korea Times,  01-10-2012)

Publisged as “Towards a co-operative Korean partnership” (A-Times On-line, 10 Jan. 2012)

See report (in Korean) about the Regional Meeting of ROK National Unification Advisory Council in Sydney, 28 Oct. 2011in Korean here…

A Proposal for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia

(By Morton H. Halperin, Nautilus Institute, January 3, 2011) If the international community is seen to accept North Korea as even a de facto permanent nuclear power there would be a very serious deterioration of the security situation in East Asia and globally.  Notwithstanding the current consensus in both Japan and South Korea against developing nuclear weapons, I believe that a nuclear North Korea would eventually compel South Korea and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons and the danger of an armed conflict in which nuclear weapons might be used would significantly increase.  This would pose a serious threat to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Until and unless it becomes absolutely clear that reversing North Korea’s nuclear program is not possible, Western security policy in the region must be directed at persuading the North to give up its nuclear weapons and commit to a verifiable regime to insure its permanent compliance.

There is no prospect of that happening unless the United States also pledges not to threaten the North with nuclear weapons. An agreement would be more likely if Japan were included in a treaty creating a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWF zone) for Northeast Asia. The prospects for such an agreement would be increased if it were embodied in a more comprehensive agreement on peace and security in the region.

Therefore, in order to break the current impasse that has prevented any real negotiations for several years, the parties to the Six-Party talks should seek to negotiate, initially through bilateral channels, the text of a comprehensive treaty that would end the state of belligerency from the Korean War, establish a security organization for the region, commit all parties to normalization of relations with no hostile intent, and establish an NWF zone.  Once an agreement on the text was reached, the parties could negotiate the process for bringing it into force…

The elements of the comprehensive Treaty on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia would include:

1. Termination of the state of war This is clearly a major objective of North Korea. This section of the treaty should be adhered to by the armistice nations and by South Korea.  It should provide for the normalization of relations while providing support for the eventual unification of the Peninsula.  The agreement should provide for opening the border between the North and South and the pulling back of military forces in the demilitarized zone.  The territorial disputes between the North and South, including at sea, should either be settled or the two parties should commit to a peaceful resolution of the disputes.

2. Creation of a permanent council on security The treaty should transform the Six-Party talks into a permanent council and support organization to monitor the provisions of the treaty and to provide a forum to deal with future security problems in the region.  In addition to the six parties to the treaty, other states from the region could be invited to join as full participants or observers.

3. Mutual declaration of no hostile intent This is a key objective of North Korea, which put great stock in getting such a statement from US President Bill Clinton’s administration.  It was flummoxed when the administration of President George W. Bush simply withdrew it and when President Barrack Obama’s administration continued this policy.  To be credible, this commitment must be embodied in the treaty and affect all the parties’ relations with each other.

4. Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy The right of all parties to the treaty to have access to necessary sources of energy including nuclear power will need to be affirmed.  Any limitations on North Korea will need to apply equally to the other non-nuclear parties to the treaty. A new multilateral framework might be appropriate to deal with the fuel cycle. North Korea will also want assurances that its energy needs will be subsidized.  Beyond a general commitment this will probably need to be negotiated as a separate agreement.

5. Termination of sanctions/response to violations of the treaty The parties to the treaty will need to commit to refrain from the use of sanctions on any other party to the treaty and to remove them from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.  The parties would reserve the right to collectively impose sanctions on any state that violates its commitments under the treaty.

6. A nuclear weapons-free zone Finally, the treaty would contain a chapter that would create a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia…

… De-nuclearizing the Korean Peninsula must remain a high priority of the international community.  Failure to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear capabilities will lead to further proliferation and to a more dangerous world.  The outline proposed here, with a flexible NWF zone, is a way forward that deserves careful consideration.

See the full text of the article here…

*Morton H. Halperin served four US presidents and is currently a Senior Adviser at the Open Society Foundation. Halperin notes that, as the Six-Party talks aimed at eliminating North Korea’s nuclear program remain stalled, a fresh approach incorporating the concept of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia should be considered as a way of ensuring peace and security in the region.

Dialogue, food aid for N. Korea needed: Rep. Manzullo

(by Lee Chi-dong, WASHINGTON, Dec. 18, 2011 Yonhap) A senior U.S. congressman expressed support for the shipment of food aid to hunger-stricken North Korean people and also stressed the need for continued dialogue with the communist regime. Rep. Donald Manzullo, a Republican from Illinois who leads the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, questioned the effectiveness of further sanctions on Pyongyang.

“We have to continue talking, but also I don’t know how many more sanctions we can have on North Korea than we have now, aside from a blockade,” he said in a recent interview with Yonhap News Agency at his office. It was the 10-term lawmaker’s first interview with Korean media. He is known for his efforts to bolster the alliance between Seoul and Washington. He said that after decades of fierce debates, the North Korea issue has drawn bipartisan solidarity.

“It’s nonpolitical in Washington, our attitude and the actions we take toward North Korea, which is sort of interesting because in Washington almost everything is political. But when it comes to this, nobody is criticizing the president for not doing more or taking another approach on it,” he said.

He said there is basically no difference between the Bush administration’s policy on Pyongyang and that of the Obama government. “There is a time to negotiate and a time to stand back,” he said. That is why, he said, North Korea is not a topic in television debates among the Republican Party’s presidential hopefuls. “The reason they don’t talk about it as an issue is that everybody sort of agrees on the same strategy,” he said.

Manzullo, who has a very conservative voting record, said he backs food aid for North Korea as long as the transparency of distributions is guaranteed. “We just want to make sure that if American food goes there or dollars to buy food, that it gets into the hands of the people who need it. That’s always been a problem,” he said.

His comments came as the U.S. and North Korea had working-level talks in Beijing last week to discuss the terms of possible food aid, which the U.S. government formally calls “nutritional assistance.” The North hopes for rice but the U.S., worried that it may be diverted into the military, wants to send more perishable items such as formula, biscuits and instant noodles, according to diplomatic sources. The representative said it is a matter that has to be determined by the governments of the two sides.

On Iran, he strongly called for South Korea to cut trade with the Middle Eastern country to join the U.S. move to toughen sanctions on it. South Korea imports about 9 percent of its crude oil from Iran. Announcing a set of new sanctions against Iran on Friday, Seoul did not touch on oil imports. “Get the oil from somewhere else. And whatever South Korea can do they should do,” he said, adding it’s “ironic” that South Korea, seeking to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, would not take the same tack with Iran.

He said he does not expect a major change in the U.S. military presence on the peninsula despite defense budget cuts. The U.S. has around 28,000 troops in South Korea. “I hear no talk at all in Washington that with the defense cutback that there is going to be any change in our present troop levels in South Korea,” he said. “I don’t see that happening.”

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The Death of Kim Jong-il

(by Sandra Fahy, USC Korean Studies Institute, Breaking News Brief Vol. 3, No. 2, December 19, 2011)

Kim Jong-Il died of heart failure on December 17th 2011, what is the significance of his death for North Korea?

In some ways the sky has fallen in North Korea. Refugees I met in Seoul and Tokyo said that when they lived in the North the leaders were like two pieces of the sky. One piece of the sky fell with the death of Kim Il-Sung in 1994 and on December 17th 2011, the second piece fell. What they meant was that the leaders defined their world, brought good days or bad, constituted all that they knew.

That is how they used to think, but living in relative safety outside of the North with the new perspective gained through leaving home, it is not uncommon for North Koreans to refer to Kim Jong-Il with an explicative attached to his name. They readily see his culpability in the horrendous rights violations inside the country. Indeed, if there is any mourning within the North Korean refugee community, it is because there is no longer a chance to bring Kim Jong-Il to International Criminal Court or to assassinate him. The refugee community is likely to have mixed feelings of relief and frustration, such as we saw over the death of Gaddafi in Libya. A world class criminal has slipped away without punishment. Any death is a great shock, and this one is no different. Though the North has prepared for it, a gaping uncertainty pervades this event. Will Kim Jung-Un be capable to his new role of leadership? Will the military seize this national distraction as an opportunity to enforce new governance? Will the tired cold war relic which is North Korea finally break down?

In my work with refugees in Seoul and Tokyo, they expressed a longing for this day and I imagine many of them are thrilled at the news. There is little to celebrate about North Korea, but finally we have something. Refugees I worked with longed for the death of Kim Jong-Il because they identified his leadership as the source of their suffering, and the continued suffering of their friends and family back home.

The phrase decapitation of the regime has been used to describe opportunities for change in the country. Does the death of Kim Jong-Il signify a “decapitation of the regime”?

The North Korean refugees I spoke with identified the death of Kim Jong-Il as something which could bring change, but it was not seen as an event that would inevitably bring change. It takes more than one individual to turn a country into the kind of condition we see in North Korea. North Koreans know this best of all. Consider that while they lived in the North, often for many decades, they hardly once identified either leader as the cause of their difficulties. Instead, the country’s failings were attributed to the selfish changes in the social fabric of the
population, or negative outside forces. The locus of power in North Korea is represented by the leader, but the delivery of power, the abuse of power, is carried out indirectly on behalf of the leader. This is a crucial element in any regime’s control of a population.

There are literally millions of little Kim Jong-Ils, ordinary government officials, soldiers, guards and police throughout the nation who carry out the abuse of power. Why they do this requires more explanation than there is space for here. The point I am making is that we need to consider that this type of regime is highly complex, the ordering and abuse of power is part of a system of control. The removal of a representative piece, here Kim Jong-Il, is hugely significant for what it represents, but in practice the system will likely carry on. This is why the North Koreans I spoke with identified the death of Kim Jong-Il as a potential for bringing change, but not a factor that would invariably bring positive change.

I worry that the regime has learned from the rocky years between former successions, with the death of Kim Il-Sung and the start of Kim Jong-Il’s leadership, and will take this opportunity to strengthen popular support for Kim Jung-un. Particularly as the death comes so close to the 2012 “Strong and Prosperous Nation” celebration which falls on the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-Sung’s birth. Kim Jung-un will be presented as the new young leader taking North Korea into 2012 and achieving North Korea’s promise of greatness. He has a lot of work ahead of him, but he will have plenty of support.

What does the death of Kim Jong-Il mean for the region?

The death of Kim Jong-Il is something North Korea watchers have been anticipating, particularly since learning of his ill health with his stroke in 2008. What this death means for North Korea, only time will tell. On an official level, the country has gone into a state of mourning which is said to last until December 29th 2011. As with the death of Kim Il-Sung, official news agency announcers have given the solemn, teary-eyed report of the leader’s death. Kim Jong-Il’s death was anticipated for some time, which is why Kim Jung-Un has been groomed for the leadership role.

Kim Jong-Il died in the midst of renewed diplomatic efforts to resume talks about the country’s nuclear weapons program. North Korea will likely cancel what would have been the third round of bilateral nuclear talks with the US in Beijing expected to take place next week. At the talks, North Korea was anticipated to accept the US offer of food aid in exchange for suspension of uranium enrichment. North Korea desperately needs food aid, in particular the military will need to be fed and they pose the only viable group that could cause significant political unrest, so I suspect they will return to the bargaining table with the US before too long. The bilateral talks were seen as a stepping stone towards resumption of the Six Party Talks, suspended since 2008.

*Sandra Fahy is a post-doctoral research associate at the Korean Studies Institute, University of Southern California. She is currently completing a book manuscript about her research with North Korean refugees. Fahy can be reached at smfahy@gmail.com

은둔국가의 절대적인 지도자 김정은

(김혜선 기자, 호주국민헤럴드 12月22日2011年)  ‘은둔국가의 절대적인 지도자’, ‘핵무기 개발로 일본과 한국 등 전세계를 위협하는 독재정치로 경재를 더욱 궁핍하게 만든 인물’, ‘기근과 경제적 어려움에도 야만적인 정권을 유지해온, 정치적으로 노련하고 무자비한 지도자’등은 세계언론들이 북한 김정일에 대한 다양한 평가들이다. 갑작스런 김정일의 사망을 둘러싸고 많은 의혹들과 미래의 남북한 문제들에 관한 여러 예견들이 난무한 가운데 본지는 12월 20일 시드니대학교 한국학과 교수이며 한국전문가인 레오니드 페트로브교수와 전화인터뷰를 하였다. 그는 캔버라 출장 중에 있었다.

1.    김정일의 사망에 관해 많은 의혹들이 있는데(특히 2달 전에 이미 김정일이 사망을 했고 그 후 쿠테타가 일어났었다는 설까지도) 그런 의혹들에 대한 생각과 김정일의 부재는 북한의 미래에 어떤 영향을 미치게 될까?

김일성은 1986년 소련의 정치적 붕괴이전 심한 스트레스로 인한 심장마비가 왔었는데 그 당시에 김일성의 사망 루머가 있었다. 1994년 7월 8일 삼지연 별장에서 다시 심장마비가 왔었고 기상악화로 헬기가 뜨지 못해 큰 병원으로의 이송에 실패하면서 죽음을 맞게 되었다. 김일성은 1994년 9월 김영삼 전 대통령과 한국에서의 첫 회담을 결정 한 후 보수세력들의 강한 반대로 많은 스트레스를 받았다고 한다. 김정일 역시 그때와 비슷한 상황이 발생한 것 같다. 김정일은 2012년을 북한이 ‘강성대국’이 되는 해로 정해놨었다. 그래서 북한의 주민들은 2012년이 오기만을 기다리고 있었고 김정일은 내부적으로 경제적문제나 외교적인 문제로 많은 스트레스를 받았을 것으로 본다. 이미 한번 쓰러진 병력이 있는 김정일은 열차를 타고 가다 심장에 문제가 발생했고 충분한 의료장비가 없었기 때문에 심근경색이라는 사안으로 죽음을 맞게 된 것이라 생각된다. 북한에서의 쿠테타란 있을 수 없다. 북한의 정권체제를 잘 모르는 사람들이 쿠테타란 말을 쓰는 것 같다. 김정일은 자신의 부재를 완전히 준비했다. 김정은을 자신의 후계자로 지목하고 철저하게 정권이양을 했다. 김정은 정권체제의 향후 2-3년 동안의 행보가 북한의 미래에 큰 영향을 끼칠 것으로 본다.

2.    김정일의 사망 이후 북한과 중국과의 관계에 변화가 있을거라 생각하는가?

중국과 북한의 관계는 미국과 한국과의 관계에 비례한다. 이명박 대통령의 친미정책은 북한과 중국과의 관계를 더 결속하게 만들었다. 중국이 강조하는 3No가 있다. 한반도전쟁 No, 북한이 무너지는 것 No, 미군기지가 중국국경에 근접해있는 것 No. 중국도 남북한의 문제로 머리가 복잡하다. 중국과 북한의 관계에 김정일의 부재는 그리 큰 영향을 끼칠 것으로 보지는 않는다.

3.    6자 회담을 앞둔 김정일의 죽음이 남북한의 관계와 한반도 통일의 문제, 그리고 국제정세에는 어떤 영향을 미치게 될 것인가?

북한의 핵문제를 해결하기 위해서는 한국전쟁이 끝나야 한다. 남북한은 1945년 일본으로부터 해방은 되었지만 통일국가를 수립하는데 실패하고 1948년 남북한에 각각 정권이 들어서면서 분단을 맞게 되었다. 1950년 발발했던 한국전쟁은 미국등 16개국의 연합군, 그리고 중국과 소련이 개입이 되면서3차 세계전쟁으로 확산될 위험까지도 있었다. 한국전쟁은 1953년 7월 27일 당사자인 한국은 제외된 채 유엔측 대표와 북한 대표간의 18통의 휴전 협정문서에 서명을 함으로 휴전협정이 이루어지고 휴전만 한 상태로 오늘날까지 이르게 되었다. 현재 미국은 북한에 강경한 태도로 일관하고 있으며 북한의 주위의 국가들에게까지 경계의 눈초리를 보내고 있는 시점에서 친북을 하던 주변국가들은 미국의 눈치보기에 급급하여 북한은 무역이나 교육 등 외국과의 교류는 현재 전혀 생각 조차도 못하고 있는 실정이다. 미국이 외교적으로 북한을 인정하지 않고 북한이 고립된 상태로 있는 한 북한의 핵 문제는 해결점을 생각하기는 어려울 것이다. 북한의 핵 문제는 북한이 외교적 문제에서, 특히 미국과의 문제가 해결이 되었을 때(미국이 전쟁을 먼저 시작하지 않을 것이란 확신이 섰을 때) 자연스럽게 해결될 문제이다. 강경했던 김정일의 부재는 미국과 북한과의 대화를 자연스럽게 이끌어낼 가능성을 생각해볼 수 있다. 북한이 미국과의 전쟁의 위협에서 안정이 되고 좀더 경제적으로 자립할 위치에 있게 되고 남한과의 교류가 자연스럽게 이루어질때 그때가 남북한 통일의 문제에 관해서 이야기할 수 있는 시점이 되지 않을까 싶다. 미국이나 일본, 중국과 러시아가 개입된 6자 회담보다 제일 당사자인 북한과 한국과의 교류나 대화가 더 중요하다. 미국이나 일본, 중국 그 어느 나라도 남북한의 통일을 원하는 나라는 없다.

페트로브교수는 북한이 더 이상 고립되지 않도록 자연스럽게 국제사회로 이끌어 내는 일이 중요하다고 강조하였다. 교수는 6자회담에 별 희망을 거는것 같지 않았다. 그와의 인터뷰를 하는 동안 한반도 분단구조를 유지하려는 주변의 국가들과 한반도의 문제를 공유해야며 북한에 문제가 있을 때마다 미국의 시나리오안에서 움직일 수 밖에 없는 남한의 현실을 너무 당연하게 받아들이고 있는 우리들이 안타깝게만 느껴졌다. 북한이 앞으로 어떠한 위치에 처하든, 경제적 그리고 외교적인 어떠한 문제들도 결국은 우리가 안고가야할, 우리들만의 문제이고 과제임을 잊어서는 않될 것이다.