What Did Kim Jong-il Want?

(Leonid Petrov, The University of Sydney) Speculations about the Last Will and Testament of the late North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il, who died on 17 December last year, are mounting and raise many questions about the future of inter-Korean relations. Separate parts of the alleged document have been recently obtained by the South Korean think tanks, the Sejong Institute and North Korea Strategic Information Service Centre.

The purported Will was obtained via a person very close to a top North Korean official. It says that the North should make peace with the South, but only after the current President Lee Myung Bak’s official term is over. When a new leader comes to power in Seoul, North Korea must avoid a war and should move forward hand-in-hand with the South. Peaceful reunification is named as the ultimate goal for the Kim family, who has ruled the DPRK since 1948. Concrete policies according to the will include that the two Koreas should consider opening the inter-Korean rail, roads and sea links. Moreover, the document also says that if the two Koreas go to war again with each other, the devastation would leave the entire Korean peninsula centuries behind other countries.

Still, Kim Jong-Il advises his successors that when pursuing relations with the South, the North must ensure that it is in a militarily advantageous position. Specifically, future leaders must “Keep in mind that constantly developing and keeping nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, and biochemical weapons is the way to keep peace on the Korean peninsula, and never drop your guard.”

In its relationship with the United States, the Will insists: “We have to win the psychological war with America. By standing up imposingly as a legitimate nuclear power, we have to weaken the US influence on the Korean peninsula and work toward lifting international sanctions to prepare external conditions for economic development.” According to Kim, North Korea must return to Six-Party Talks, but only to gain official recognition as a global nuclear power state.

It is interesting that with respect to China, Kim Jong-Il warns his countrymen to be vigilant, stating: “Historically, China is the country that forced difficulties on our country, the country that currently has the closest relations with us, but could become the country we need to watch most in the future. Keep this in mind and be careful. Avoid being exploited by China.” This frank appraisal explains the perturbed attitude which the late leader had towards his country’s long-term sponsor and ally.

Apart from international relations and security, Kim Jong-Il’s last Will elaborates on three other areas: hereditary succession; the adherence to Military-First Policy; and the role of nuclear energy in the development of the domestic economy. As predicted, his youngest son, Kim Jong-Un, succeeded Kim Jong-Il. However, it is his younger sister, Kim Kyong-Hee, who was named as the Executor of the Will. She is the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, where she supervises the Light Industry sector.

As for Kim Jong-Un, he should be named the Chief of the National Defence Committee within one year of the reading of the Will. Thus, if this document is authentic, we shall see Kim Jong-Un occupying the highest post in the DPRK sometime in late December 2012. In the meantime, the junior Kim has already been promoted to the rank of Four Star General and Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army, the First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, and the First Chairman of the National Defence Commission.

The Will also states that the interests of Kim Jong-Il’s children from previous marriages should be protected. The late leader of North Korea requests special care be extended to his eldest son, Kim Jung-Nam, that he be permitted a comfortable life abroad. Kim’s daughter from the first marriage, Kim Seol-Song, is also to be given a special status in the family. Surely, these actions are designed to unite and strengthen the Kim dynasty and to avoid the danger of internal strife. As a result, Kim Jung-Nam will continue residing in China and won’t need to seek asylum in South Korea or in the US. Likewise, Kim Seol-Song will never become a rival to her half-brothers, Kim Jong-Un and Kim Jong-Cheol.

Furthermore, the family funds in Samcheonri safe No.216 are ordered to be transferred to Kim Jong-Un, while all state finances (domestic and international) are to come under the management of Kim Kyong-Hee. She and her husband, Jang Seong-Taek, were named as chief political advisors to Kim Jung-Un. As the executor of the Will, Kim Kyong-Hee has gained the greatest influence over Kim Jong-Un compared to other members and figures of other elite groups. Jang Seong-Taek has remained at the top of the political pinnacle of North Korea, but his role is limited to supporting and advising Kim Jung-Un. There are several other people whom Kim Jong-Il wanted to see as military and economy advisors to his successor, but they will continue to play secondary and temporary roles, not having enough authority to make executive decisions.

These days, North Korea watchers in South Korea and overseas are debating and evaluating the veracity of this document. There is no consensus yet, but the “Will of Kim Jong-Il” helps us understand the current situation in North Korea and tells us much about the direction which the country is likely to advance. After reading the Will, one can realise the nature of sudden and hardly explicable actions perpetrated by North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-Il.

For example, the ongoing aggressive anti-Lee Myung-Bak campaign can be better understood as an effort to inculcate in North Koreans the thought that no dialogue or reconciliation with South Korea is possible until the incumbent president is gone. Similarly, the recent launch of the ballistic missile, as illogical as it may look, appears more like a careful calculation, where food aid and improved external relations were sacrificed by a regime desiring to boost the pride and confidence of the population on the eve of important national holiday, the centennial anniversary of Kim Il-Sung’s birthday.

Most importantly, the “Will of Kim Jong-Il”, whether authentic or fake, emphasises the importance of inter-Korean relations and encourages Koreans in the North and South to resume dialogue and cooperation. Despite the belligerent rhetoric, which leaders of the divided country use to attain their immediate political goals, the long-term goal for all Koreans is peace and security. This can be achieved only if Seoul and Pyongyang make reconciliatory steps, re-building trust and respect toward each other.
–

Read the Korean version of this article here… 김정일은 무엇을 원했을까?

–

Pirates or Hawks: Who Hijacked the Chinese Fishing Boats?

(Leonid Petrov, The University of Sydney) China often describes its relations with North Korea, its closest regional ally, as intimate but not substantial. For more than half a century, Beijing’s attitude towards the Korean peninsula has revolved around the avoidance of three scenarios: ‘No new war on the Korean peninsula’; ‘No regime change in North Korea’, and ‘No American troops on the Sino-Korean border’. But can the developments of recent weeks shake this strategic alliance tested by time, wars and revolutions?

This year North Korea declared that it has reached its self-professed goal of becoming a strong and affluent state. However, the state of its cross-border trade and cooperation with China indicates otherwise. There are signs that inside North Korea’s closed borders the domestic situation in the DPRK is deteriorating and the regime is using every opportunity to use government agencies to earn the desperately needed cash and goods.

A range of UN sanctions have been imposed on North Korea. In response to two nuclear tests and recent ballistic missile launches, a ban on luxury goods has been imposed on North Korea by the UN Security Council. The country is now hard at work, evading these bans, with the help of China. Almost all imports of luxury goods (cigarettes, cosmetics, cars, watches and computers) go to North Korea via China. The criminalisation of border trade with North Korea is notorious within China, whose government does not officially recognise the contraband goods to qualify as ‘luxury items’. This ambiguity often creates situations replete with potentials for border conflicts between the former communist allies.

One incident unfolded in the Yellow (West) Sea on 8 May 2012, where three Chinese fishing boats, with 29 Chinese fishermen onboard. They were abducted by unidentified and armed North Koreans, who demanded the payment of ransom for their return. The vessels were seized in a traditional Chinese fishing area, about 10 nautical miles from the maritime boundary between the two countries. Seven Chinese boats were initially taken; four were later returned to the port of Dandong in return for ransom. Three Chinese boats remained in the hands of the unnamed North Korean kidnappers for another 13 days.

While these kinds of incidents are common, this one developed in an unusual way. As a rule, Chinese ships owners pay the ransom through private channels. There are many individuals and even companies involved in such cases and, on many occasions, they are well connected to DPRK marine forces. This time, however, the armed hijackers approached the Chinese fishing vessels on a speed boat. They wore blue hats and uniforms and some of them spoke perfect Mandarin. They initially demanded the payment of 400,000 Yuan (AU$65,000) for each boat, but later lowered their request and threatened to ‘dispose’ of the boats if the money was not sent through within a short deadline. The demand was transmitted by satellite phones through the crew members, who were kept in captivity on shore without food and were reportedly subjected to beatings.

The fact that the captors gave the kidnapped sailors the mobile number of an intermediary in the border town of Dandong to discuss how to send the ransom suggests that the captors were international group of pirates. For some ten days the Chinese government worked closely with the North Korean maritime authorities, to ensure the safety of the Chinese citizens. Pyongyang, however, has still not commented on the incident. While the nature of this incident remains unclear, it came after Beijing criticised a recent North Korean rocket launch and expressed concern over another nuclear weapons test planned by Pyongyang. This raises a very serious question: Were the hijackers real pirates or was this in fact all a carefully planned retaliation, by the DPRK government, against China?

The North Korean defectors who are familiar with the chain of command in maritime border protection assert that the three Chinese fishing boats were seized by operatives of DPRK General Bureau of Reconnaissance. They usually use armed speed boats which belong to West Sea Base No. 2 located in Nampo and secretly enter international waters to fulfil special missions. Their speedboats are disguised as mid-size fishing vessels but equipped with four Russian made M-400 engines. The General Bureau maritime bases also conduct infiltration missions against South Korea and exist both in the East and West Sea.

The initial reports of the attack testified that the group of captors was wearing blue uniforms and hats and included several Chinese-speaking people. However, the involvement in this particular incident of Chinese criminals is unlikely. The staff members of General Bureau of Reconnaissance are fluent in Mandarin because they are trained to operate in Chinese waters. For example, the operatives stationed at East Sea Base No.1 are required to speak excellent Japanese.

Could the General Bureau of Reconnaissance suddenly decide upon the capture of Chinese fishing boats simply to earn money? Capturing foreign nationals and their property would inevitably create a diplomatic problem and could not be done without the approval of authorities. Discipline in North Korean military is stern and hierarchy is thoroughly observed. While scheming with the authorities to demand money from the captured Chinese sailors, they must have intended to express discontent at something else. What message did the North Korean authorities want to convey to Beijing?

The moist likely scenario was that the abduction of Chinese fishermen was carefully planned by the new leadership in Pyongyang in retaliation for China’s continuing criticism of the North Korea’s April rocket launch and ongoing preparations for another nuclear test. In addition, Beijing recently permitted a number of North Korean defectors to leave China to seek asylum in South Korea that could not but anger the DPRK leaders who wanted to teach China a lesson.

The timing of the incident (8-21 May) also supports this hypothesis. It coincided with the joint US-ROK aerial exercises Thunder Max, which was held between the 7th and 18th May. While these exercises take place on an annual basis, this year’s activities were of a particularly massive scale. These war games in the skies of south-western Korea not only send a warning message to the DPRK but also to China, serving to further strengthen the security cooperation between Beijing and Pyongyang. Paradoxically, joint US-ROK military exercises equip North Korea with extra leverage over China.

Beijing, however, is refusing to link the dots. So far the Chinese Foreign Ministry is labelling the incident a ‘fisheries case’ and searching for the traces of criminal gangs in Dandong. Clearly, Beijing is trying to soft-pedal the incident and avoid open antagonism with its long-term regional ally. All signs indicate that this incident will not negatively affect the strong political ties between the two countries. In the situation where the Chinese government at all costs prefers to maintain the status quo on the Korean peninsula, such a minor incident will not force Beijing to stop supporting the DPRK, a buffer state which separates its own borders from the US-allied South Korea.

After all, the Cold War in the region is continuing, Northeast Asia remains divided and paranoid, and its main front line still divides the Korean peninsula.

–

See the Korean version of this text here…  해적이거나 호커스이거나

–

Northeast Asia – a Region without Regionalism

(Leonid Petrov for East Asia Forum, 23 May 2012)

Last week once again demonstrated to the world the sad truth about the inability of Northeast Asian nations to establish good working relations in political and economic spheres. The ambitious plan to build a Free Trade Zone across China, South Korea and Japan was pompously declared, only to stumble over old unresolved issues. The legacies of colonialism, international wars and civil conflicts persist, thwarting any attempts to rebuild trust and achieve multilateral cooperation.

The creation of a network of FTAs between the neighbouring states could serve as a confidence building mechanism toward deepening regional integration in East Asia, but efforts have been lagging. Japan and China have yet to enter talks for a bilateral FTA. South Korea and Japan suspended negotiations for a bilateral FTA in 2004 and have made little progress since. This year Seoul has agreed with Beijing to start negotiations for a bilateral FTA, and the first session took place in Beijing on 14 May.

The trade ministers of South Korea, Japan and China for the first time agreed to launch negotiations for a three-way FTA by the end of this year. South Korean President Lee Myung-bak met in Beijing with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda for annual summit talks, where they discussed the future of tripartite economic cooperation. The three leaders shared the view that a trilateral FTA would boost trade and investment among the three countries and provide a framework for comprehensive and structural cooperation.

But at the press-conference after the summit, South Korean President Lee looked less enthusiastic than his Chinese and Japanese counterparts. Lee said the trilateral FTA would be meaningful to the countries’ future, but avoided answers regarding the possibility of concluding the FTA negotiations within two years. Also further undermining confidence among the three countries, Chinese President Hu Jintao refused to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda without any explanation. Speculators have suggested Hu’s cancelation may have been triggered by the heated debate on May 13 between Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Noda over the sovereignty of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, or Japan’s granting of a visa to Uighur leader Rebiya Kadeer to run the World Uyghur Congress in Tokyo.

The three leaders also discussed the continuing North Korean provocations, but the absence of North Korea in these negotiations was conspicuous. A successful regional FTA could allow products produced in North Korea to be freely sold in South Korea and Japan, helping its flagging economy. Similarly, the lack of consumer goods in North Korea could be rectified by an influx of quality products from South Korea and Japan. But for ideological reasons this opportunity remains closed for North Korea.

It is no coincidence that just days prior to the trilateral summit in Beijing, the President of North Korea’s Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Kim Yong-nam, went for his first foreign trip since the death of Kim Jong-il. But rather than heading to China, he went to Southeast Asia where he met with the President of Singapore, Tony Tan, and the city-state’s parliamentary leader Michael Palmer. Kim Yong-nam was accompanied by Ri Kwang-gun, who heads the Joint Venture and Investment Commission, and An Jong-su the Minister of Light Industry. Obviously, North Korea is trying to attract foreign investment by offering itself to manufacturers interested in cheap labour, and to boost exports of its own consumer products and minerals. In Singapore the leaders discussed a variety of issues, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula and bilateral relations, but President Tan and Mr Palmer stressed that while Singapore was open to advancing bilateral relations with North Korea, they were constrained by the fact that North Korea remains subject to UN Security Council sanctions.

The following day, Kim Yong-nam flew to Indonesia, where he also drummed up support for foreign investment. Most western multinational companies avoid direct business with North Korea because of US trade embargo. Washington has warned financial institutions in Southeast Asia that they should not do business with North Korea. Banks in Macao and Singapore stopped doing business with North Korea several years ago. Given this backdrop, what is the reaction of Indonesia to such pressure?

Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono called for dialogue to resolve problems on the Korean peninsula, while Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa suggested that isolating North Korea further was not a constructive solution. When discussing the issue of the controversial rocket-satellite launch, Yudhoyono underlined that misunderstandings should be avoided through dialogue and communication. Kim Yong-nam was assured that there are areas where cooperation is possible. For example, the two leaders resolved to raise bilateral political relations by promoting visits by officials, ministers, managers, and media professionals of the two countries. The media swap deal will allow networks in both North Korea and Indonesia to share content and participate in journalist exchanges.

North Korea is clearly trying to curb its excessive reliance on China by reaching out to other countries in Asia. But how many countries can or will help North Korea integrate successfully? Why should North Korea look for partnerships away from its own region? Would not it be more logical to improve relations with its immediate neighbours, namely South Korea and Japan? Is the US or Russia willing to see the three countries building a genuine free trade platform in the region? The combined population of the three major Asian powers is around 1.5 billion people, with an aggregate GDP of US$15 trillion or 20 per cent of the world total. The establishment of a multilateral FTA would definitely help lay a foundation not only for strong economic partnership, but also for trust, reconciliation, and reliable peace in the region.

But developments over the last week have shown once again that domestic affairs appear to carry more weight for national leaders than regional projects. The disputes of the 20th century continue to affect the hearts and minds of politicians in the two Koreas, China and Japan. And it may take longer than expected before regionalism in Northeast Asia will prevail over political mistrust and economic protectionism.

–

See the Korean version of this article here…  동북아시아- 지역주의 없는 지역

–

Like Father, Like Son

(James Giggacher’s inteview with Leonid Petrov, ANU Reporter, May 2012)

On a frosty winter’s day in December last year North Korean dictator Kim Jong-il breathed his last breath. Steely, yet teary-eyed reporters from the country’s official news agency told the world the 69-year-old had “passed away from great mental and physical strain”. Later reports would reveal that the Dear Leader was travelling to the country’s north on his armoured train when he reached the end of the line; a massive heart attack the cause of death.

But, Dr Leonid Petrov, a research associate in the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, has a slightly different take on this version of events. The analyst, who has been watching North Korea closely for decades, says that Kim Jong-il, whose health had been on the rails for a while, suicided.

“Why did Kim Jong-il suddenly die in December just a few weeks before 2012,” Petrov asks. “It was because it was very convenient and almost the perfect time for him to die. He surely understood that and had carefully prepared the country for a smooth power transition. That’s why I think he committed suicide.

“2012 is a significant and pivotal year in North Korean history. It is the centennial anniversary of the birthday of the country’s first leader and Kim Jong-il’s father, Kim Il-sung. It is also the year when Kim Jong-il promised to take North Korea to self-proclaimed strength and prosperity. Obviously, North Korea is not very strong, except militarily. And it is very far away from prosperity.

“Clearly, Kim Jong-il did not deliver on his promise. He felt ashamed, he felt pity for his people and he felt he was getting weaker. He had already appointed his successor, his third son Kim Jong-un and he felt his job was done – he did not need to do anything else. So, Kim Jong-il takes cyanide and dies instantly of a heart attack without any pain.”

Petrov also points to the inconsistency in the story about the leader’s whereabouts at the time of his death as another reason why official reports cannot be trusted. According to him, Kim Jong-il’s armoured train never left Pyongyang.

“At the moment we still don’t know what exactly happened. North Korean propaganda says Kim Jong-il was visiting a province in the north of the country, inspecting military bases, but satellite images show that his armoured train never left Pyongyang during the week he died. So obviously he was in Pyongyang at the time of his death. He didn’t plan to go anywhere.”

Regardless of whether Kim Jong-il’s death was natural or not, Petrov is certain of one thing; his son is safe at the top and is in no immediate danger of flat lining anytime soon – even if there were recent reports of his assassination in China.

“No way are the assassination rumours true,” says Petrov. “If the rumours said that he was killed in North Korea, well maybe. But, assassinated in China? No. As soon as they said China I knew it was not true. He didn’t plan any trips to China, he didn’t cross the border. Every time the North Korean leader travels the security precautions are extraordinary. There is no way.

“What happened immediately after Kim Jong-il’s death was all planned out and very well-orchestrated. Kim Jong-un was immediately catapulted to the driving seat and was made chairman of his father’s funeral committee. He was out meeting the people, and playing the role of a populist, providing free fish to everyone, just like Jesus Christ when he fed fish to the poor. He also allowed the military to visit and pay homage to him and was seen crying in public. It was planned and scheduled and the immediate transition was very smooth.”

Despite his youth and relatively obscurity – at least in the West – Petrov adds that there is no doubt that Kim Jong-un is North Korea’s number one man.

“Kim Jong-un is young and seniority is respected in North Korea, which means that for the moment he has to follow the advice of his seniors – the older members of his family and senior military and party officials. In Korean history, regents were often appointed to help a young king fulfil his duties. Similarly, Kim Jong-un can’t make decisions by himself. However, this doesn’t mean that he’s a puppet, not at all.

“Kim Jong-un is the successor; he is of the imperial blood and he’s widely recognised as such. He’s eulogised and worshipped as the generalissimo by the military, as a member of the revolutionary dynasty by the members of the communist party and as the token of stability by the members of the Kim family. So everyone really has great hopes for him.  And, now that he is in power I think that Kim Jong-un will stay in power for a very long time.”

Something else that will continue for a very long time is the tightly controlled nature of existence in North Korea. Beyond the pantomime of public grief and loss, the leadership succession represents a scratched record playing the same old sad tune of repression, poverty and isolation from the rest of the world for the North Korean people. The succession was not only an elaborately thought-out and smoothly executed transition from one generation of the ruling Kim family to the next; it was designed to maintain as much stability in the country as possible. Kim Jong-un, who according to Petrov “even looks like his grandfather Kim Il-sung”, is the past made present in order to lead North Korea into a future that looks depressingly familiar.

“The whole point of Kim Jong-un’s succession was to avoid any change in North Korea, because change, threatens the very existence of the North Korean state. If you look at what happened to the Soviet Union when Gorbachev started Perestroika (or opening up to the West), he couldn’t control the situation. He lost power and the country collapsed and disintegrated. North Korea would implode if they started playing with any sort of change or reform, economic or political.

“And so the elites in North Korea say ‘no thanks’ to any idea of change. The idea is to maintain stability and continue what Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il had been doing during the last half a century. Stability and continuity are the key issue.”

Ultimately, by stability and continuity, Petrov means dynastic endurance and the ongoing rule of the Kim family. “We should look at North Korea as a hereditary dynasty in a kingdom which is the personal property of the Kim dynasty,” he says. “This dynasty is supported by the army and the communist party, particularly the top level of the army and the party who lead comfortable lives with lots of freedoms and privileges. They have a lot to lose if a change of regime happens and there is a lot more to lose than in countries like Libya and Syria. There’s a lot more at stake; the national integrity of the country is at stake because just next door is a strong, prosperous, affluent South Korea, which will not forego the opportunity of absorbing North Korea in the case of some disturbance, chaos or economic collapse.

“The reason for North Korea actually existing is the survival of the regime and the survival of the Kim dynasty.  It’s constantly announced to the people that without the supreme leader Kim there is no Fatherland-. Without the party we can’t survive. Without the army we’d be enslaved.

“So survival is what drives the existence of the state and justifies the control of the Kim family. And survival doesn’t have to mean prosperity. North Korea is a poor state and for the last 60 years, since the Korean War, the people have been living in very harsh conditions. But, as long as they have some food and some electricity and a little bit of freedom – to be able to move from one province to another to visit relatives or to trade – we can expect no major change.

“No major protests will occur either. There is simply no room for opposition. There are no alternative sources of information, there’s no space for thinking about freedom or revolution of any kind like the Arab Spring. So, everything will stay the same as long as the leadership decides to keep things the same. Kim Jong-un was chosen as a token of continuity and stability, so don’t expect change from him. As long as he decides to stay, to keep the country secluded, closed, poor, intimidated, it will continue as it always has.

“North Korea is a revolutionary state frozen in time and will remain frozen. The people are not exposed to any foreign influences, they have nothing to compare life to; they just have to trust in what their leaders tell them, and their leaders tell them don’t expect any change.

“It’s a very sad story.”

–

See the Korean version of this article here…  그 아버지에, 그 아들

–

Success of “Unsuccessful” Launch

It seems that on 13 April North Korea has deliberately aborted the launch of its Unha-3 rocket by letting the first stage of the booster to blow up just one minute after the lift-off. By so doing, the DPRK has avoided the situation where it would have been shot down by South Korean or Japanese anti-missile defense (despite serious doubts about their capability to do so).

North Korea lives in a virtual reality. It is a revolutionary state where nothing changes. It is officially ruled by the deceased leaders. And its people continue to suffer from the shortages of food and energy but claim they do not envy anyone.

The controlled detonation of the booster could be the face-saving exercise – a better option compared to the potential embarrassment which would have been caused by Japan or S.Korea’s anti-missile defense forces. Surely, something went wrong in the first seconds after the lift-off and the Central Control Room must have decided to abort the flight of Unha-3 after one minute of the flight.

As the result, everyone will stay safe and happy: rocket scientists in Pyongyang have learnt more about their project, conservative politicians in Seoul and Tokyo are celebrating the victory, and the Obama administration does not look soft on North Korea any more. Even Moscow and Beijing may now feel reliefed that North Korea does not pose as much threat to the neighbors as it had been anticipated before the launch. And the people of North Korea, while being informed that Juche-style science and technology is the best, are even more consolidated around the Young General.

–

Kim Jong Un taking Pyongyang down lonely path

(by William Choong, The Straits Times, 14-04-2012) North Korea, hosting nearly three dozen foreign journalists on a rare media visit this week, has sought to sell them two hoary chestnuts.

Pyongyang has the right to launch a peaceful satellite, the journalists are told, and a successful launch will further its aim of becoming a “strong and prosperous” nation. Yesterday, however, the chestnuts were roasted rather than toasted.

The Unha-3 rocket splashed into the Yellow Sea after a minute of powered flight. Ironically, an Associated Press journalist tweeted from Pyongyang that a traditional Korean folk song, Roasted Chestnuts, was being played on state television at the time of the launch.

The launch, not unexpectedly, drew strong condemnation from many countries, which stressed that it was a cover for a ballistic missile test. For the first time, Pyongyang – to its credit – admitted that the launch failed. In 1998 and 2009, it insisted that satellites had been lofted into orbit when in fact they had not.

Pyongyang’s insistence on pushing through with the launch has rallied the global community, which has been seeking to manage its missile and nuclear programmes for more than two decades.

“They want to show the world that they are capable of developing a long-range ballistic missile,” Dr Andrei Lankov, an associate professor at Kookmin University in Seoul, told Bloomberg News. “It has not happened. So this will decrease the efficiency of their blackmail diplomacy.”

The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council – Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States – have held informal talks, according to an Agence France-Presse report, and the council is expected to issue a statement to condemn the North’s latest act. The US, South Korea and Japan called the launch a “provocative act”. Even Russia, an old ally of North Korea, has said that the launch was in breach of UN resolutions which imposed sanctions after Pyongyang’s first two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.

Yesterday’s launch – Pyongyang’s third test of a space rocket since 1998 – would accelerate joint efforts by the US, Japan and South Korea to build missile defences. This would blunt the North’s missile threat and impact China’s relatively small arsenal of nuclear weapons. China, a long-time ally of North Korea, said it was “very concerned” by the launch and that all efforts should be made to defuse tensions. But even Beijing would be hard-pressed to maintain its support for Pyongyang.

More importantly, Pyongyang under new leader Kim Jong Un seems to be on a path that will leave it increasingly isolated. News reports said that the North might proceed with a third nuclear test to make up for yesterday’s humiliation.

Mark Fitzpatrick, a non-proliferation expert at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the failed flight would still provide North Korea with information necessary for missile development. “Unless the North Koreans are deterred or otherwise dissuaded, they probably will eventually meet their goal of developing a long-range missile,” he said.

Taken together, however, a third nuclear test and the development of long-range missiles would only accentuate Pyongyang’s isolation. In the long term, the global community will have to play the same old waiting game. The Americans call this “strategic patience”, or waiting for North Korea to either implode or effect a change of heart.

In his latest book, The Impossible State, Dr Victor Cha says that a growing contradiction in North Korea would only accelerate under its youthful new leader. A growing gulf between the state and the North Korean people will “cause a crisis of governance and uproot the foundations of the regime”, writes Dr Cha, who served as Asia director at the National Security Council under former US president George W. Bush.

Ultimately, an easing of tensions on the Korean peninsula would come about only when the North, in the words of President Barack Obama, unclenches its fist. For now, this looks unlikely, given Kim’s need to stage a show of strength to bolster his currency at home.

This is why South Korea will continue to be wary of further provocations by the North. China, too, will continue to worry whether any softening of Pyongyang’s hardline position would lead to a historic reunification of the two Koreas – and the deployment of US troops near the Korea-China border.

Korea watcher Leonid Petrov, from the University of Sydney, says the global community might have to wait for new administrations to be installed in South Korea and the US before any new policies are put in place. Both countries are holding presidential polls at the end of the year.

Obama is in a fix: He can seek to reconcile with the North and be accused of appeasement, or stand firm and be accused of being too inflexible. As Dr Cha says: “I can tell you that North Korea… is truly a land of lousy options.”

Ballistic Blackmail?

(John Larkin, “Asia 360: News in Context” 30 March 2012) To the outside world, North Korea’s latest diplomatic provocation is a puzzling reversal, to say the least. As a by-product of Pyongyang’s ruthless pursuit of regime survival however, it just might make perfect sense.

Less than three weeks after signing a deal with the United States to suspend nuclear and missile programmes, Pyongyang put the pact at risk by announcing a plan to launch a satellite that most observers believe amounts to a missile in the making.

Under the February 29 deal, Pyongyang agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and long-range missile tests, as well as allow inspections of nuclear facilities, in exchange for 240,000 tonnes of food aid over the next year. Assuming the launch goes ahead, that deal appears to be a dead letter. Why would Pyongyang agree to freeze its weapons programmes in return for a mountain of food aid, only to deliberately wreck the pact within days?

“It doesn’t sound logical or consistent,” says Leonid Petrov, a Korea specialist at Sydney University. “But North Korea has its own logic.” Driving Pyongyang’s logic is the paramount importance of regime survival. Faced with the choice of feeding its hungry people or flexing a new military muscle to bolster domestic support, Pyongyang will opt for the latter every time, say North Korea watchers.

The launch of the Kwangmyongsong 3 satellite is scheduled to happen between April 12 and April 16 — during mass festivities to commemorate the centenary of North Korea’s revered founder Kim Il-sung. Pyongyang claims the satellite is a peaceful initiative justified under the Outer Space Treaty, which codifies the use of space under international law.

The rest of the world, even its ally China, believes the ballistic technology can also be used for missile development and therefore violates two UN Security Council resolutions. All of North Korea’s major neighbours, and the UN, have denounced the launch plan. But Pyongyang has some good reasons to ignore the outrage.

North Korea’s leadership has promised that 2012 will be the year the nation emerges as kangsongdaeguk: strong and mighty. Kim Jong-un is under pressure to deliver appropriate fireworks on April 15. He plans to spend US$2 billion, a third of North Korea’s total annual budget, on the centennial celebrations, according to an estimate published by South Korea’s Chosun Ilbo newspaper.

“This is like a holy day in North Korea, a day to celebrate a strong and mighty nation,” says Kongdan Oh, an East Asia specialist at the Institute for Defence Analyses in Washington. “What better way to do that than launch a rocket using ballistic technology?”

Pyongyang looks willing to sacrifice a closer relationship with the US, supposedly one of its top foreign policy goals, at the altar of regime security. “US relations can wait five, or even 10 years,” says Petrov. The question is whether Pyongyang’s volte-face was premeditated. If it was, says Petrov, the calculus may have been to hope that the US takes the line that humanitarian assistance is apolitical, and delivers the food aid anyway.

Even if Washington retracts the food aid, Pyongyang can revert to its time-honoured tactic of accusing the US of pursuing a hostile policy, then blame it for the inevitable escalation in security tensions. Adding credence to this view is the nature of the food aid. The brains at Pyongyang probably calculate that it would not lose much as the aid comprises mostly high-nutrition biscuits destined for women and children rather than the Korean People Army — a crucial support pillar for the regime.

Symbolism matters in Pyongyang. While a satellite launch will not put food into bellies, it will help to bracket the younger Kim with his grandfather Kim Il Sung, thereby sanctifying his stewardship. The satellite’s name, Kwangmyongsong, means right shining star, an oft-employed euphemism for the elder Kim. “There’s a lot of symbolism to this launch,” said Petrov of Sydney University. “Mysticism is an important part of this as it will distract people from the realities of their harsh lives.”

One intriguing theory is that the sudden back-pedalling from the conciliatory food aid agreement reflects fractures within Pyongyang’s ruling echelon, with hardliners vetoing reformists who framed the February 29 deal. “The situation then appears to be two different groups of elites, with two different intentions,” Andray Abrahamian, a North Korea specialist at Ulsan University in South Korea, wrote recently in the Pyongyang-watching blog 38 North.

But with Pyongyang’s machinations and motives as opaque as ever, the real question is how the US and, possibly, the UN Security Council will react to this latest affront. Pyongyang’s decision to launch from the west coast rather than the eastern pad used in two previous failed launches, means the rocket is not likely to fly over Japan. This might be enough to prevent a UN Security Council sanction.

“I don’t think that they will face any significant penalties,” said Marcus Noland, deputy director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. “While the Chinese are reportedly displeased, it’s hard to imagine them implementing tougher sanctions.” Perhaps the clearest takeaway from this morass of conflicting agendas is the difficulty of negotiating with a nation that refuses to abide by the traditional norms of diplomacy.

Yet again, the US finds itself snookered by Pyongyang. If it delivers the food aid as promised, it will stand accused of caving in to ballistic blackmail. Yet if it withdraws the aid, Pyongyang will happily pocket another win, using Washington’s “hostile” policy to justify its continued possession of missile and nuclear weaponry.

As world leaders gathered in Seoul for a summit on nuclear security this week, North Korea insisted that it would go ahead with the launch, calling it “a legitimate right of a sovereign state”. European Union leaders expressed “grave concern” at North Korea’s missile and nuclear weapons programmes, and urged Pyongyang to scrap the launch. Japan also used the summit to call on Pyongyang to show restraint.

Washington’s next step will be crucial to determining how the imbroglio will play out. Most analysts expect it to retract food aid, which could hand the initiative to Pyongyang.

North Korea could conceivably invite nuclear inspectors into the country, then kick them out on the basis the US did not provide promised food assistance, said Victor Cha, a senior advisor at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “It would be hogwash, but all of a sudden we’d look like the bad guys,” said Cha. “How did we get ourselves into this situation?”

North Korea’s 100th – To Celebrate or To Surrender?

by Gavan McCormack (“North Korea’s 100^th – To Celebrate or To Surrender?” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 14, No 2, April 2, 2012)

On 16 March 2012, North Korea announced that it would launch an earth observation satellite named Kwangmyongsong (Lodestar) 3, aboard an Unha carrier rocket sometime between the hours of 7 am and noon on a day between 12 and 16 April, to commemorate the 100^th anniversary of the birth of its state founder, Kim Il Sung, and the attainment of “strong and prosperous” status by the country. The launch from a base in the north of the country close to the border with China would be pointed south, dropping off its first phase rocket into the Yellow Sea about 160 kms to the southwest of South Korea’s Byeonsan peninsula and the second into the ocean about 140 kilometres east of Luzon in the Philippines.

Due notice of the impending launch was issued to the appropriate international maritime, aviation and telecommunication bodies (IMO, ICAO and ITU) and, to mark the occasion, North Korea announced that it would welcome scientific observers and journalists. The 15 April date, in the 100^th year according to the calendar of North Korea, has long been declared a landmark in the history of the state, and the launch seems designed to be its climactic event.

Meteorological earth observation satellites (multi-functional, but weather forecasting central) are either polar orbiting (Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite or POES) or stationary. This one, North Korea later made clear (KCNA, 26 March), was to be an “advanced geostationary meteorological satellite data receiver.”

Where polar orbiting satellites circle the globe 14.1 times each day on a north-south polar axis commonly at a height of around 800 kilometers, geostationary ones obit it roughly every half-hour at a height of around 33,880 kilometres (thus requiring advanced rocketry capacity), and because of their height they remain stationary with respect to the orbiting earth. Both types are multi-functional and in the words of the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) they are able to “collect global data on a daily basis for a variety of land, ocean, and atmospheric applications … including weather analysis and forecasting, climate research and prediction, global sea-surface temperature measurements, atmospheric analysis of temperature and humidity, ocean dynamics research, volcanic eruption monitoring, forest fire detection, global vegetation analysis, search and rescue…” Many satellites, military and civil, are launched every year. The US has three of the stationary variety in operation. Russia, Japan, Europe, China and India also operate geostationary satellites, joined in July 2010 by South Korea. Japan conducts fairly regular launches from its Tanegashima space station site, and devotes some of its information gathering capacity to spying on North Korea.

Satellites, of whichever type, are a mark of advanced scientific status and economic development. As a country that especially in recent years has suffered from acute weather irregularities, presumed due to global warming, and is surrounded by satellite-operating states, North Korea has a strong interest in itself joining the select company, both for motives of pride and face as well as for scientific and economic reasons. A covert military purpose, development of intercontinental ballistic missile capacity, may be assumed, since the rocketry is virtually the same, only the load and the trajectory differ; but this is true of all satellite-launching countries. North Korea became a signatory to the Outer Space treaty (of 1966) in 2009, and now protests that it alone of the world’s nations cannot be denied the universal right to the scientific exploration of space simply because of that convergence of civil and military technology…

… As at time of writing (30 March 2012) there are several possibilities. Pyongyang might, although it seems unlikely, choose to buckle under the pressure and cancel the launch. Such display of weakness and repudiation of the legacy of the late leader would have unpredictable domestic consequences, and the act of submission would likely encourage the member states of the Beijing group to demand more.  If, however, Pyongyang resists all pressures and proceeds with the launch, either the launch succeeds or it does not. If an “advanced geostationary meteorological satellite” duly takes its place in the skies, the world will face a fait accompli. Despite sanctions and irrespective of its poverty and isolation, North Korea’s claim to a place in the ranks of advanced scientific and industrial powers would be reinforced and, sooner or later, the hostile powers would have to return to the agenda of September 2005: a comprehensive peninsular peace and normalization agenda. If on the other hand the launch is unsuccessful and/or the vehicle breaks up or enters a missile trajectory, North Korea would face considerable loss of face both domestically and heightened hostility internationally, making early resumption of the Six Party talks unlikely. Embattled, it might resume nuclear testing (as it did when the Security Council denounced the failed launch in 2009), the regime’s hold would likely weaken and the “North Korea problem” might become just so much more difficult to resolve.

The merciless stare which almost the entire world fixes upon North Korea is not to be understood solely in rational terms. The stare is less fierce, it is true, in the case of Russia and China, but both on this occasion seem at least to be joining the coalition of the hostile in urging North Korea to cancel the launch and avoid “provocation.” For much of the world, however, the country serves as a kind of ultimate “other.” Over much of the apst half century, and certainly since the end of the Cold War, no country has been so lacking in international sympathy or solidarity. The United States and Japan expect others to condemn North Korea, and it is easy to find cause to condemn and much less likely to cause offence in the global quarters that count than any serious attempt to identify and pursue global powers that are responsible for aggression and abuse on the grand scale. Thus the Government of Australia, having shown no previous interest in peninsular matters and no understanding of the historic context or of the core of legitimacy that encapsulates North Korea’s cry to the world, to declare itself threatened by the imminent launch and to demand it be cancelled is simply a cheap and empty gesture…

See the full text of this article here…

Author

Gavan McCormack is an emeritus professor of the Australian National University and a coordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal. He is author of many books and articles on modern and contemporary East Asia, and many of his articles are accessible on this site. His Target North Korea: Pushing North Korea to the brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, was published in 2004 and translated and published in Japanese and Korean. In 2008 and 2009 he contributed a monthly column to the Seoul daily Kyunghyang shinmoon. His discussion with John Dower of the prospects for 2012 was featured on NHK satellite television as its New Year program (“Kantogen 2012″). His most recent book, co-authored with Satoko Oka Norimatsu, is Islands of Resistance: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States, forthcoming, Rowman and Littlefield, July 2012.

–