China-N. Korea Ties Emphacised in Xi’s Letter to Kim

In this photo released Thursday, June 20, 2019, by China’s Xinhua News Agency, visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping, left, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wave from an open top limousine as they travel along a street in Pyongyang, North Korea. AP-Yonhap

Following the outburst of North Korean missile launches, Xi Jinping’s memorandum sent to Kim Jong Un can be seen as a strong diplomatic signal of China’s improving relations with the US. The Chinese president’s communication to his Comrade in Pyongyang shows more of his willingness to support Joe Biden and his perception of ‘regional and global peace and stability’ than to entertain the North Korean dictator’s urge for constant intimidation of Korean peninsula inhabitants and their neighbours. After meeting at the G20 in Bali, leaders of the two economic and military superpowers must have agreed to place value on diplomacy in looking after each other’s national interests and, ultimately, the concerns of international community. When the diplomatic messages are explicit then they are more likely to achieve a preferred goal. President Xi’s message is both friendly and prescriptive because it seeks to reassure North Korea’s national security and offer some broad tonal signal to various conflicting sides in the region that China would not tolerate any provocations.

COVID-19 in North Korea

Rather than creating chaos in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the COVID-19 pandemic has been turned into an opportunity for the Kim dynasty to further tighten its grip on power, Leonid Petrov writes.

On 23 January 2020, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) became the first country in the world to shut its borders in response to COVID-19. A week before the World Health Organization proclaimed the outbreak of the coronavirus a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, North Korea’s third-generation Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-Un, apparently realised the danger a foreign virus could pose to the people and his power.

When the pandemic became official in March 2020, North Korea watchers began speculating on the possibility of it destabilising the DPRK. One commentator predicted that “quarantine will likely fail to stop the spread of coronavirus into North Korea”.

Another assumption was that a serious outbreak in North Korea coronavirus could be more effective than international sanctions in dismantling the diehard communist system and ending its dangerous nuclear program.

In fact, North Korea was well prepared for this, and it has faced other crises better than many may think. Professing its policy of national self-reliance – or Juche – since the 1950s, North Korea survived the prolonged period of Sino-Soviet ideological and military rift before the fall of the Soviet Union, for instance.

That North Korea even continues to exist after the collapse of the Communist Bloc can partly be attributed to its insistence on economic independence. Though this of course has come with harsh military rule maintained by the Kims. In fact, the regime has proved highly resilient, despite predictions of economic reform or regime collapse.

The DPRK survived the Arduous March – a euphemism for its great famine – of the 1990s largely caused by the collapse of its public distribution system, and sealed borders saved the DPRK from the SARS crisis in 2003 and Ebola outbreak in 2014 despite the nation’s dilapidated healthcare system…

Read the full article here…

The International Forum on One Korea Webinar

We’re excited to showcase our second webinar in our 2020 virtual forum series with “Free and Unified Korea: Northeast Asia Regional Collaboration on Denuclearization and Economic Integration.” This virtual event is less than a day away! The forum will be accessible at 8:55 PM Seoul time and 7:55 AM New York time on September 30th. For your convenience, we will provide the access link below

Please click directly through to the Webinar through this link: https://zoom.us/j/93242505023. You will then be prompted by a Zoom window to input your name and email. After this, you will be able to access the Webinar.

We look forward to your participation and a great online event!

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AACAPS webinar “75 years since the end of World War II: commemoration and historical understanding”

Thursday 24 September 2020, 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm (AEST)

Three quarters of a century have passed since the end of the most catastrophic military conflagration in human history: World War II. Paradoxically, however, the more that time passes the more we seem to remember it, in official and popular culture: commemorations, memorials, movies and books, above all in Post-Soviet Russia. Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, commemorations of the 75th anniversaries of the German and Japanese surrenders in May and August 1945 respectively by the victorious former Western Allies were subdued affairs. In Washington, President Trump laid a wreath; in Paris, President Macron spoke in front of a near-deserted Arch de Triumphe; in locked-down London, Queen Elizabeth gave a televised address. In Moscow and Minsk, nevertheless, Presidents Putin and Lukashenko oversaw massive military parades celebrating victory in the “Great Patriotic War”.

Such official commemorations usually celebrate the virtues of nation, state and people that seemingly made victory possible. But commemoration is one thing, historical understanding is another. This raises many questions, among them: Why is it being commemorated? What was really at stake in this titanic conflict? What were its consequences? And even, did the war actually end?

This webinar, hosted by The Australasian Association for Communist and Post-Communist Studies (AACaPS), brings together four experts in the field to start a conversation about these issues: Professor Mark Edele (Melbourne University), Professor Roger Markwick (Newcastle University), Associate Professor Alexey Muraviev (Curtin University) and Dr Leonid Petrov (ICMS, ANU).   We look forward to you joining us.

Find out more about the speakers online.

Thursday 24 September 2020, 4:00 pm – 5:30 pm (AEST)

Register for Live webinar via ZOOM

RSVP by Wednesday 23 September 2020

What’s driving North Korea’s actions toward the South?

By Deutsche Welle (2020/07/14) Leonid Petrov, a former chair of Korean Studies at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, says the North’s destruction of the liaison office is intended as a sign that “Pyongyang does not need Seoul any more in the context of this new Cold War.”

Whereas North Korea was frantically trying to build bridges with Seoul and the United States just three years ago, as international sanctions bit hard into its economy, President Trump has since fallen out spectacularly with China and Russia. That has given Pyongyang the opportunity to rebuild its own ties with Beijing and Moscow; both now see North Korea as a useful geo-political bargaining chip and are likely to continue their support for Kim’s regime.

“By blowing up the liaison office, the North is saying that there is no need to communicate with the South anymore. I suspect they may soon start testing weapons again, and even possibly nuclear warheads,” he added. “This new Cold War is actually very good news for Kim because his regime can now thrive.”

South Korea convened an emergency meeting of the National Security Council on Tuesday afternoon and troops were ordered to step up surveillance of the North and be prepared for further provocations in the tense border area. The Pentagon had previously stated that it was keeping a “robust” defensive posture on the peninsula and that US forces were ready to respond to any situation that might evolve.

Given that the North has now followed through on its threats to destroy the liaison office, its next move may very well be to send troops back into areas on the border that were demilitarized under the 2018 military agreement. It is possible that troops will return to Kaesong and the Mount Kumgang tourist zone, on the fareast coast, where military installations on both sides were destroyed two years ago.

The South Korean government has reiterated that it intends to stand by the terms of the agreement and has called on Pyongyang to do the same.

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The Trillion Dollar Battle Over North Korea’s Rare Earth Elements Is Just Beginning

By Patricia Schouker (The National Interest June 16, 2020)

Here’s What You Need To Remember: It is no exaggeration to consider that the “Art of Negotiation” also applies to rare earth elements. If Washington isn’t serious about the rare earth resources of North Korea, then the winner, once again, could be Beijing. Moscow, too, could benefit from Washington’s loss given that China needs continued access to energy resources in Russia and Central Asia, as well as to Russia’s advanced military technologies.

When looking at contemporary geopolitics, often energy and related resource questions are key in the struggle for influence amongst world powers, as energy can drive or amplify underlying tensions. Today, the attractiveness of traditional oil exploration loses ground with the emergence of new energies and technologies, often produced by “Rare Earths” and the elements they contain.

The DPRK could have a high concentration of rare earth elements, but given that it is a reclusive country, it has not yet exploited these resources, which could upset the current global order. Just as the Cold War split the world along ideological lines, this new struggle for resources will create fissures between those who have access to rare metal resources and those who do not. Because entire industries are built on a few rare metals, disruptions to their supply can have profound global implications while providing some countries with tremendous leverage.

Erbium, Thulium, Cerium, Samarium, Lithium . . . these are some of the elements that under the “rare earth” label. Many of the technological advances that have been realized over the past several decades have elements derived from the seventeen elements of the periodic table.

Not insignificantly, rare earth elements are also an essential component for the arms industry. “Neodymium” is used to produce bombs, lasers, radars and sonars, “Dysprosium” for missile guidance and video systems, and “Terbium” is used for electric motorization. The United States owns the third largest reserve in the world, with the Mountain Pass rare earth mine in California. That mine was the world’s leading producer until the 1980s, which is when China entered the element market and created a near global monopoly. The main factors in this market takeover were the availability of cheap labor and a lack of concern over environmental and work conditions. Currently, it is estimated that China controls more than 95 percent of the world’s production of rare earth minerals, with about fifty-five million tons of deposits.

Recent studies suggest that North Korea could have the world’s largest rare earth reserves. These deposits cannot at present be exploited due to a lack of significant demand and crippling sanctions—the country being cut off from external markets and having not yet developed a society based on mass consumption. Today’s new projects need more experienced infrastructures, which increases the costs of starting projects, creates higher operating costs, and leads to the production of more expensive metals—an investment North Korea cannot afford.

The Jongju site, in North Korea, is home to nearly 216.2 million tons of rare earth oxides, double the known world reserves. In terms of monetary value, if these figures are accurate, South Korea estimates the value of the mineral resources of its North Korean neighbor at $2,800 billion. In comparison, the GDP of South Korea was about 1,530,75 trillion in 2017. According to the Korea Resources Corporation (KORES) report, North Korea could hold vast amounts of magnesite (six billion tons), graphite (two billion tons), iron ore (five billion tons) and tungsten (250,000 tons). The country could become a key player in the rare earth industry, as demand peaks for smartphones, semiconductors and related products. Pyongyang said it could exploit up to twenty million tons of these seventeen elements, with China as its potential buyer. Rare earth metallurgy is also essential for United States, Russian and Chinese weapons systems. The U.S. Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system requires rare earth elements, as do Russia’s S-400 and S-500 missile defense systems.

Nothing seems to be able to unblock the exploitation of North Korea’s subsoil minerals for external purposes, except through possible international agreements, the lifting of sanctions, or, in an extreme case, military intervention. These elements offer new insights on the geopolitical situation that surrounds North Korea.

While China is gaining distance from its former ally, drastically reducing its import of coal from North Korea on the grounds of “non-compatibility with their new anti-pollution standards,” Russia, on the other hand, is increasingly eyeing the rare earth resources of the country. South Korean companies could also consider new economic agreements to exploit these resources.

During the 1990s and 2000s, North Korea’s immense energy potential has pushed several South Korean conglomerates, including KORES, to invest in mining projects in the North and to consider the development of infrastructures to facilitate rare earth exploitation. The Kim regime has neither the financial means nor the technological expertise necessary to exploit these mines on their own. KORES has analyzed that Pyongyang has already signed a total of forty investment agreements with foreign entities—90 percent with China, despite ongoing sanctions.

Several South Korean officials have been alarmed by Beijing’s interest. According to South Korean parliamentarian Park Young-sun, “The Government must act quickly because China has already secured many mineral resources in North Korea. If South Korea can import mineral resources from North Korea, it could use it stably for several decades.” Since South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un have resumed talks, South Korean authorities are openly talking about a further extension of the North-South railway infrastructure project. The DPRK could be on the verge of being integrated into a vast supply chain infrastructure via a Metal Silk Road-a strategic partnership between Russia and China investing simultaneously in railways, pipelines and ports parallel to a Chinese like North-South Korea Special Economic Zones (SEZ) which is a geographically delineated area subject to unique regulations and administration from the host country in which it resides, in order to attract foreign direct economic investment that could not otherwise be achieved. Four specific regions in North Korea could be considered national priorities—Rason, Unjong, Wonsan and Sinuiju. These zones, with a variety of intended functions and ostensibly foreign-friendly regulations, signal a willingness of the Kim regime to explore economic policy options. Although the Kim regime may be promoting special economic zones as a key piece of its economic development strategy, there is still a long way to go to ultimately make these zones successful.

The first UN Sanctions against North Korea date back to 1993 and they have been counterproductive, as they pressured Pyongyang further in attempting to blackmail the world with its nuclear weapons and missile tests. North Korea has opted today for a predictable deterrence strategy, namely, to increase their missile tests to demonstrate its determination, but also its defense capabilities in an international environment which they deem hostile.

One way out of this crisis could be a potential de facto recognition of North Korea’s nuclear power status, similar to India, Pakistan or Israel, that obtained nuclear weapons sans international approvals. This option would be an admission of failure of nonproliferation policies but could break the stalemate that pushes Pyongyang to move further in its nuclear program and missile threats. An agreement in 1994 had already raised many expectations and hopes for a way out of the crisis: North Korea was required to give up its nuclear program in exchange for energy assistance from South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States who had committed to building two light water nuclear power plants in North Korea. This agreement failed in the absence of commitments from the different stakeholders.

It is no exaggeration to consider that the “Art of Negotiation” also applies to rare earth elements. If Washington isn’t serious about the rare earth resources of North Korea, then the winner, once again, could be Beijing. Moscow, too, could benefit from Washington’s loss given that China needs continued access to energy resources in Russia and Central Asia, as well as to Russia’s advanced military technologies. China’s attempts at energy acquisition constitute a significant challenge to American policy. The puzzle can therefore revolve around who offers the best return on investment, only not on real estate, but rather on rare metals, with Kim Jong-un able to potentially collect a huge fortune. Is China able to match a possible U.S. agreement? Would another summit provide an opening for a second chance?

Patricia Schouker is an energy and security analyst based in Washington D.C. She is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Payne Institute Colorado School of Mines and an Associate Member of New College, Oxford University. Twitter: @Patricia_Energy. This article first appeared last year.

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Love the North Korean Style: Alek Sigley’s Misfortune is a Coded Message

Last weekend the world was baffled by the statement of the (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) which explained why Alek Sigley, the Australian student who had studied at the Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang, was detained, investigated and expelled. Nobody, including seasoned North Korea watchers, could make sense of this brief but eloquent statement that became viral among Western media even before it appeared on the KCNA official site.

The statement lambasted Mr Sigley for secretly conducting “anti-government propaganda via the Internet”. It said he was caught “red-handed committing anti-DPRK incitement through Internet” and questioned by the “relevant institution” on June 25. Investigation revealed that at the instigation of various ostensibly anti-DPRK media organisations Alek “several times handed over the data and photos he collected and analysed while combing Pyongyang”. He was able to explore the city because he held an identity card that labelled him as a foreign student”. The newsagency said that Mr Sigley “honestly admitted his spying acts”, “repeatedly asked for a pardon”, and apologised “for encroachment upon the sovereignty of the DPRK”. The DPRK government expelled him from the country on July 4, “by showing humanitarian leniency”.

It is true that, while studying in North Korea, Alek was a prolific user of various social media platforms and new means of communication. In 2019, he penned and published his writing on-line, describing the local restaurants, male and female fashion, mobile apps and popular hobbies. Perhaps, this was a marketing strategy to attract more attention to his business project, Tongil Tours, which he was running in addition to his work on the Master Thesis in Literature tentatively entitled “Love the North Korean Style”.

This would be innovative and interesting contribution to the North Korea Studies because no western scholar has systematically analysed how Love is understood in the most secluded and militaristic society on Earth. Alek must have been combing the streets and alleys of Pyongyang (which is romantically nicknamed in Korean a “willow capital”) in search of dating couples and happy families. In North Korea, marriage is permitted only if sanctioned by the state. To achieve that, every young man must serve 10 years in the military and every young woman must reach “revolutionary maturity” through studies or work. Until then Love can be expressed only towards their comrades, community or nation.

Creative research like this cannot be done is isolation and requires discussion and feedback. The use of the Internet in North Korea is permitted only to foreign visitors and residents, including international students, diplomats, accredited journalists and NGO staff. All of them have different visa types, which should not be confused. International students in North Korea are not supposed to report or exchange pictures and videos with foreign media outlets. In a country where every piece of foreign printed material must be meticulously declared at customs, uncensored access to the Internet poses a serious risk to national security. That is why ordinary North Koreans have no access to the World Wide Web or the telephone lines that can receive or make calls outside of the country. They use the Intranet and closed telephone and mobile networks monitored by the government.

Alek had the privilege of benefiting from the wonders of the 21st century while living in a country deeply stuck in the Cold War ideological conflict. DPRK national security law is fierce and intolerant to anyone who might breach it on purpose or accidentally. The grey area created by the usage of social media was bound to attract the attention of the almighty Ministry of State Security to Alek and his research. The two questions to consider here are “why did it happen now?” and “how is it that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was so fond of Alek and his work, could not even answer the question about his whereabouts?”

Perhaps the most plausible answer is that DPRK is not a monolith with single-hearted unity that speaks with one voice. There are many factions inside with very different views, and even if you are loved and in good graces of some parts of the DPRK government, the State Security apparatus is a coequal branch of government that rarely agrees with outward-looking people. The stability of the DPRK comes from this inertia that prevents any real change from happening. This also makes it very dangerous for naive foreigners who don’t get that there is no one-man rule or consolidated unity in what the government says, does, or thinks. One of the biggest misconceptions is that Kim Jong-un is the omnipotent autocrat who gets whatever he wants. The truth is much more complex: North Korea has its own “deep state”, just like any other nation.

For those who still believes that North Korea’s human rights record is problematic, they did not forget to remind us that Alek Sigley‘s release was an act of “humanitarian leniency”. People in the government wanted to show us that they have read Michael Kirby’s Report on Human Rights in North Korea and learnt their lesson.

Finally, we should not underestimate the Koreans’ penchant for symbolism in dates and numbers. Whatever was the reason for this strange security operation, Alek Sigley was arrested on the 25th June, the date when the Korean War started, and was liberated on the 4th July, when Americans were preparing to celebrate their national day. Perhaps, someone in the government wanted to do it in solidarity with the American people’s successful struggle against monarchy and colonialism.

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Excerpts from this piece were used by the Sydney Morning Herald and The West Australian newspapers.

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Luck had nothing to do with Alek Sigley’s escape from North Korea

(Opinion by Leonid Petrov, The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 July 2019)

The last two weeks have been eventful in the contemporary story of North Korea. The first visit of China’s President Xi Jinping to Pyongyang was followed by the first visit to the Demilitarised Zone by US President Donald Trump. There he met North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in. Separated by a week, both events will potentially play a role in ending the Korean War, the oldest conflict of the Cold War era, which remains unfinished since the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

The optimistic glow of these events was tarnished by the ongoing anxiety about the Australian student, Alek Sigley, who had suddenly stopped communicating with his family and friends after staying in Pyongyang for more than a year. There was something symbolic in his disappearance from view on June 25, the day when the Korean War started 69 year ago. It was not only the Koreans, Chinese and Americans who fought in that war. Australia joined it too and lost more than 330 servicemen in Korea during the three years of conflict. The prospect of losing another Australian citizen, caught up in the inter-Korean and international geopolitics, was disturbing.

What happened to Sigley, who was suddenly released on Thursday morning and safely back in Japan by Thursday evening, remains unclear to date. He was not seen at his usual place of residence and did not respond to his mobile, Skype, Messenger, Twitter and other social media calls. The North Korean, or DPRK, government refused to acknowledge that he was arrested and the Swedish government’s special envoy to North Korea, Kent Rolf Magnus Harstedt, ambiguously commented on his disappearance: “There might be a more complicated explanation, for many reasons, for the timing and the way it happened.” In his first statement after leaving North Korea, Alek himself refused to give any explanations but sincerely thanked the Australian and Swedish government officials, and many other people “who worked hard in the background as well who worked hard behind the scenes”.

The incident is done and dusted. Alek is safe with his wife, his parents and friends are relieved as much as most Australians and everyone is praising the Swedes. Perhaps, the presidents of China, South Korea and the US should be thanked for their soft intervention too. Alek’s business partner, who ran the Tongil Tours with him until last week, is now more concerned about the future of their joint venture, but this issue is more personal than geopolitical. Everyone can go back to the normal life, including the North Koreans, who managed not to make a single public statement about this curious case.

What lessons, if any, can be drawn? Everything related to North Korea remains shrouded in mystery. The secrecy of North Korean authorities makes it difficult to visit, contact and deal with the country. The main reason for that is the continuing Korean War – the last ideological and military conflict of the 20th century inherited by this century. This unfinished business is the key to understanding North Korea.

Travelling to study or do business in a war zone is associated with risks. The usual freedoms of travel, information and consciousness are often curtailed or abrogated where the conflict is ongoing. In conflict zones, people get detained and interrogated before the decision is made what to do with them next. Some, like Sigley, are permitted to go home and might even continue doing business in North Korea, if they keep their lips tight. But others, like US student Otto Warmbier, fall victim to a system that considers itself at war with the rest of the world.

Alek has not escaped this potentially harmful situation unscathed because he is “lucky”. I know him. I met him when he was a student at the Australian National University where I worked. He is very intelligent and a gentleman. I predicted from day one, after he fell off the social media radars, that he would be fine and back home soon. He knows Korea well, he speaks the language, and understands the feelings of the Korean people divided by the Demilitarised Zone. His business reputation is impeccable and his intentions are sincere. He might be willing to go back to North Korea and resume his education travel business, perhaps after some re-branding.

The Australian government might be horrified by this scenario and the Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton has already warned him not to return to North Korea. Will Sigley tempt fate once again? The answer is likely to echo special envoy Harstedt’s words: “It’s complicated.”

My advice to him would be to lie low for a while and consider the implications of what he has just been through. The situation could change quickly and soon. We may see the first quadrilateral summit – China, North Korea, South Korea and the United States – take place in coming months. A peace treaty is not out of the question. The opportunity to return under less complicated circumstances may arrive and he would be welcomed by the North Korean people.

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Donald Trump thanks Kim Jong-un for releasing US prisoners from North Korea

(Daniel Hurst, Tokyo, 10 May 2018) President Trump has thanked Kim Jong-un for the release of three American prisoners who have begun to describe their detention in North Korea.

Kim Dong-chul, Kim Hak-song and Tony Kim, who were released after Mike Pompeo, the secretary of state, met Kim Jong-un yesterday, were taken to hospital in Washington soon after their arrival in the early hours of this morning.

“I was treated in many different ways, but overall I had to do much labour and when I became ill I received some treatment,” Kim Dong-chul said, via a translator. In a joint statement, the men said: “We thank God, and all our families and friends who prayed for us and for our return. God bless America, the greatest nation in the world.”

They were met at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland by Mr Trump and his wife, Melania. “Congratulations on being in this country,” Mr Trump told them.

The president said he “very much appreciated” the fact that the North Korean leader had allowed the trio to return home before the forthcoming summit meeting. “Frankly we didn’t think it was going to happen and it did,” Mr Trump said of the goodwill gesture. “We’re starting off on a new footing. This is a wonderful thing that he released the folks early.”

Mr Trump said he hoped to achieve denuclearisation in the Korean peninsular during his summit with Mr Kim, expected to take place in Singapore within weeks. “I think we have a very good chance of doing something very meaningful,” he said. “My proudest achievement will be, this is part of it, when we denuclearize that entire peninsula.”

The prisoner release clears one of the final barriers to the historic talks between Mr Trump and Mr Kim. Mr Pompeo met Mr Kim for 90 minutes in Pyongyang before flying out of the country “with the three wonderful gentlemen that everyone is looking so forward to meeting”, a triumphant Mr Trump tweeted.

Mr Kim hailed the forthcoming summit as a historic meeting and an “excellent first step”. In comments published by North Korea’s official news agency, Mr Kim said it would contribute towards improving the situation on the Korean peninsula and the “building of a good future”.

The three American citizens were arrested for alleged hostile or subversive acts against North Korea but the charges were widely seen as politically motivated.

A North Korean official characterised the release as an amnesty and was reported to have told Mr Pompeo: “You should take care that they do not make the same mistakes again. This was a hard decision.”

The men were flown to Japan, where they transferred to another plane that carried medical specialists and equipment. It made a stopover in Alaska before proceeding to Maryland.

Kim Dong-chul is a South Korean-born businessman and missionary in his early sixties who was taken into custody nearly three years ago and sentenced to ten years’ hard labour.

The other detainees had worked as academics at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. Kim Hak-song, who was born in China and educated in the US and is thought to be 55, was intercepted at a railway station a year ago and prevented from returning to his home in the Chinese border region of Dandong.

Tony Kim, 59, also known as Kim Sang-duk, had been on a short-term teaching assignment at the university before his arrest at Pyongyang International Airport in April last year. A religious man, he was believed to have been helping at an orphanage in North Korea.

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Can the 3rd inter-Korean summit end the 70 years of Hot and Cold Wars in Korea?

Kim Jong-Un and Moon Jae-In have completely different political motives and goals, but strangely their intentions coincided this year.

Kim desperately needs to steer North Korea away from an imminent disaster (a nuclear war, a domestic upheaval or both).

Moon, in contrast, needs to keep South Korea in the comfort zone of US alliance and export-oriented economic trajectory in the quickly changing global trade and political climate.

Meeting and talking about inter-Korean reconciliation and economic cooperation will not only boost the two leaders’ popularity at home but will also give confidence to the neighbouring powers, who have been waging Hot and Cold Wars in Korea for regional domination since the late 19th century.

Everyone seems to realise today that without a peaceful Korea there will be no ultimate security and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.

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